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"It was a great day for the human race . . . when the idea
dawned that every man is a human being, an end in himself, with a
claim for the development of his own personality, and that human
beings had a dignity and a worth, respect for which is the firm
basis of human association."
MERRIAM, SYSTEMATIC POLITICS 59 (1945).
"The Independence of America, considered merely as a separa-
tion from England, would have been a matter of but little impor-
tance, had it not been accompanied by a Revolution in the prin-
ciples and practices of Governments. She made a stand, not for
herself only, but for the world, and looked beyond the advantages
herself could receive."
PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 151 (1792) (Everyman's ed.)
It is only from a perspective of centuries that the United Nations
program for "human rights" can be accurately observed or rationally
appraised. This program, too often thought to be at the periphery
of the purposes of the United Nations, represents in fact the main core
of rational objectives not only of the United Nations but of all dem-
ocratic government.' It represents the converging and integration on
a global scale of many movements, movements hitherto restricted in
areal diffusion but centuries-old and rooted deep in universal human
nature and civilized culture. 2 It is heir to all the great historic dem-
ocratic movements-for constitutionalism, freedom, equality, frater-
nity, humanitarianism, liberalism, enlightenment, peace, opportunity,
and so on.' It is the contemporary culmination of man's long struggle
for all his basic human values:
* This article has also appeared in the symposium on International Human Rights in
the Summer, 1949, issue of LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS.
t William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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1. BECKER, MODERN DEMOCRACY (1941); MERRIAM, SYSTEMATIC POLITICS, C. 2
(1945).
To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RIGHTS (1947) appropriately has for its frontispiece the words from the Declaration of
Independence: ". . . to secure these rights governments are instituted among men. .. "
Cf. Jefferson to Madison: "A bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every
government on earth, general or particular; and what no just government should refuse or
rest on inferences." 4 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 477 (Ford ed. 1894).
2. MALINOwSKI, FREEDOMs AND CIVILIZATION (1944); MURPHY (ED.), HUMAN NA-
TURE AND ENDURING PEACE (1945) ; MURPHY, PERSONALITY 905 Ct SCq. (1947).
3. LAUTERPACHT, AN INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 3-65 (1945),
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for participation in the processes by which he is governed,
equality before the law, and that wide sharing of power, both
formal and real, which we call democracy;
for sanctity of person, for freedom from arbitrary restraints and
cruel and inhuman punishments, and for positive opportunity to
develop latent talents for the enrichment and well-being of per-
sonality;
for the enlightenment by which rational decisions can be made
and for freedom of inquiry and opinion;
for that fundamental respect for human dignity which both
precludes discrimination based on race, sex, color, religion, political
opinion, or other ground irrelevant to capacity and provides posi-
tive recognition of common merit as a human being and special
merit as an individual;
for access to resources to produce the goods and services neces-
sary to maintain rising standards of living and comfort;
for acquisition of the skills necessary to express talent and to
achieve individual and community values to the fullest;
for freedom to explain life, the universe, and values, to fix stand-
ards of rectitude, and to worship God or gods as may seem best;
for affection, fraternity, and congenial personal relationships in
groups freely chosen;
for, in sum, a security which includes not only freedom from
violence and threats of violence but also full opportunity to pre-
serve and increase all values by peaceful, noncoercive procedures. 4
It is for values such as these that men have always framed constitu-
tions, established governments, and sought that delicate balancing of
power and formulation of fundamental principle necessary to preserve
human rights against all possible aggressors, governmental and other.,
The United Nations taken as a whole-Charter, organization and
practice-is but man's latest effort, though with a grander vision and
on a more comprehensive scale than ever before. It is commonly
and PRELImiARY REPORT TO I TRNATiONAL LAW AssocIATIoN, BRussSE.s Co k-€;c
(1948) ; HoicomBE, HumAN RIGHTS IN THE MODERN WOL, C. 2 (1948); Acton,
Freedom in Antiquity in HISTORY OF FREDOM AND OiHER ESSAYS (Figgis and Lawrence
Eds. 1922) ; JF.LLINEK, THE DZcr..ARoN OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF CTIze s; A
CONTRIBUTION TO MODERN CONSTrruTIONAL HIsTOR (Farrand Tr. 1901) ; FERA.Dmo, A:N
INTERNATIONAL BI. OF Hu MA RIGHTs (1948); Laski, Democracy, in 5 E,,cYc. Soc.
Sci. 76,(1931) ; Shephard, Government, in 7 id. at 8 (1932) ; Brinton, Equality, in 5 id. at
574 (1931); Ruggiero, Liberalism, in 9 id. at 435 (1933); SMITH, THE PRoM sE OF
AzmcAN Poirncs (1936) ; SABINE, A HISTORY OF PolmcAL THEORY (1937) ; RAN.D.L,
THE M AKING OF THE MODERN MIND (rev. ed. 1940).
4. For the utility in systematic analysis of this particular categorization of values,
see LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY (1948) ; Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Educa-
tion and Public Policy; Professional Train i,ng in the Public Interest, 52 YAt L.J. 203, 217
(1943) ; McDougal, The Role of Law in World Politics, 20 Miss. L.J. 253 (1949).
5. MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALIs5: ANCIENT AND MODERN (rev. ed. 1947), and
CONSTITUTIONALISm AND THE CHANGING WORLD (1939) ; Hamilton, Constitutionalism, in
4 ENcYc. Soc. Scr. 255 (1931) ; CoRwIn, LIBERTY AGAINST GOvERNMENT (1948).
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agreed, as the Charter states,6 that the principal purpose for which the
United Nations was established is the maintenance of "international
peace and security." Throughout the Charter, however, runs the
wise recognition, which pervaded all the great declarations of war aims
and general consciousness of mankind, that peace and security, even
in the limited sense of freedom from physical violence, cannot be
obtained by arbitrary fiat and sheer balancing of power.7 A peace to
endure must include the conditions of peace and a reduction of the
severe frustrations that drive men to violence." Some deprivations and
threats of external dictation men find more intolerable than war.
Peace as the common man conceives it includes more than freedom
from war and threats of war: it includes the freedom, without external
dictation from any arbitrary power, to maintain and enhance by peace-
ful, non-coercive procedures the value positions both of himself and of
all others with whom he identifies.9 Hence the United Nations Charter
insists upon a peace "in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law," states among its major purposes the achievement
of "international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion," 11
and both imposes a definite legal obligation upon its. member states
to promote this objective and establishes a machinery of its own to
take further measures.
The intensification within recent centuries, most notably since the
industrial revolution, of the demands of the individual human being
for security in the full sense indicated above, for the greater production
and sharing of all values, and especially for respect, in the sense both
of equality of access to all values and of symbolic recognition of this
equality, is a matter of common observation." The basic trend in
6. CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Preamble, and Article 1 (Dep't State Pub. No,
2353, Conference Series 74, 1945).
7. GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND
DOCUMENTS 93, 319 (2d and rev. ed. 1949).
8. MURPHY (ED.), HUMAN NATURE AND ENDURING PEAcn 29 (1945): "[T]hc risk
of- war is so great that the over-all strategy of peace calls for the reduction of severe frus-
trations rather than the futile effort to extirpate aggression by fiat, discipline, or punish-
ment.'
9. The latest authoritative reaffirmation of this conception appears in the preamble of
the North Atlantic Security Pact, which reads that the "parties to this treaty" are "deter-
mined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded
on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." (Dep't State Pub.
No. 3464, General Foreign Policy Series 8, 1949.)
10. U. N. CHARTER Art. 1.
11. For systematic review see Lasswell, The Interrelations of World Organization
and Society, 55 YALE L. J. 889 (1946). See also TAWNEY, EQUALITY (1931) ; DINGWALL,
RACIAL PRIDE AND PREJUDICE (1946); GoSNEL, DEstocRAcY; THE ThnRESHOLD Ov FRE-
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demand and community response has been well characterized as the
"fundamental democratization of society." 12 The evidences of a
major movement from caste society to free society are written large
in both doctrine and practice. All of the great post-feudal philosophies,
from liberal capitalist through socialist and excluding only the total-
itarian, have stressed the fundamental dignity of the individual human
being and demanded its realization in practice. Stimulated by modem
science and technology and by a growing uniformity in world attention
and attitudes, practice has responded in recent generations with whole-
sale liquidation of discriminations based on caste exclusions and in a
great rise in community activities designed to provide individuals with
any necessary compensating assistance required to raise them to
minimum levels and to afford positive opportunities for maturing
latent talents into socially valued expression. One could point to such
items as the extension of suffrage and improvement in representation
techniques; the creation of a free school system and the expansion of
facilities for communication; protections against arbitrary restraint
and the amelioration of punishment; provision of respected jobs at
minimum wages and shorter hours of work; conscious community
planning of resource use and development; provision of better housing
and proper medical care; unemployment programs and employment
and health insurance; social security; improvement of facilities for
recreation; and many more. With the new stimulus of promise and
threat in the development of atomic energy, it is not to be expected
that common men the world around will reduce their demands. Short
of world tyranny and intimidation, it can, on the contrary, be safely
predicted that they will both increase and still further intensify their
demands.
It is a commonplace in a world threatened by new war and atomic
destruction that all peoples everywhere are today interdependent for
securing all their basic demands, that mankind today lives in what is
in fact a world community. It is a familiar history, often recounted,
how many changes-changes in population; changes in the attitudes,
identifications, and expectations of people; changes in techniques of
organization and institutional practices; and most important of all,
changes in technology-the railroad, steamship, and airplane, the
press and tele-communications, and now atomic energy-have trans-
formed the world from relatively independent, discrete localities into
a congeries of interacting regional communities and a single world
community. 3 It may, however, be conducive to clarity to mark out
DomI (1948); LE FEVRE, LIBERTY AND EESTRAINT (1931); SCHUmAn, IhTEMATWo:,AL
PoLiTics 540 (4th ed. 1948) ; 1 VRIGHT, A STUDY OF VAP, 170 (1942).
12. MANNHEII, MAN AND SOCIMTY IN AN AGE OF REcoNsTRucrIoN 44 (1940).
13. PERRY, ONE WoRLD IN THE MAKING (1945) ("Dedicated to the Memory of Wen-
dell Willlde, the First Private Citizen of that One World Which Having Discovered for
Himself He Disclosed to His Fellow-Americans"); Wright, Accomnplislhents and Ex-
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the main outlines of peoples' interdependences with respect to security
and all the other values which we sum up as "human rights." The
most decisive value process in the world community is the world power
process in which thd nation-state is still the predominant participant.
How power is structured internally in a nation-state, how the individ-
ual human being is related to centrally organized coercion, affects
very directly how that nation-state seeks to exercise power in the
world arena, whether by violence or peaceful procedures. It has been
observed that the Nazi leaders rose to power by the systematic sup-
pression of civil liberties at home; 14 the violence they brought to the
world arena still seers mankind. History too recent makes it clear
that elites who come to power and maintain internal rule by violence
are prone to regard violence as the principal instrument of international
change; in complement, their intimidated masses are all too ready to
turn their forcibly repressed and accumulated hatreds against their
fellow men, across some arbitrary boundary line. 15 Conversely, the
pectations of World Organization, 55 YALE L. J. 870 (1946) ; WRIGHT (ED.), Tiu. WORLD
COMMUNITY (1948); MANNHEIM, op. cit. sitpra note 12, at 49; REV S, THE ANATOMY 0v
PEACE (1945) ; MEYER, PEACE OR ANARCHY (1947) ; BORDEN, THERE WILL BE No T"mr
(1946) ; UNIVERSITY OF DENVER, FOUNDATIONS FOR WORLD ORDER (1949) ; OG3URN (EN.)
TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1949); WEIGERT, STEIANSSOx AND -IAR-
RISON (EDs.), NEW COMPASS OF THE WORLD (1949); BRYSON, FINYEISTEIN, AND MAC-
IvER (EDs.), APPROACHES TO WORLD PEACE (1944); LINTON (ED.), MosT OF THE WoaL
(1949) ; Murdock, Knauth, and Thayer, Law and Lawyers for One World in, the Making,
17 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 97 (1948).
14. 3 SIMPSON AND STONE, CASES AND READINGS ON LAW AND SOCIETY 1595 (1949):
"Historically German Fascism rose to power by deliberately destroying the liberties
achieved under German democracy ... ." A graphic account of the internal deprivation
of human rights and of its connection with preparation for external aggressions appears in
the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
In Effects of International Tension on, Liberty Under Law, 48 COL. L. REv. 555, 558
(1948), Fritz Morstein Marx generalizes: "As a political system dedicated to the cate-
gorical imperatives of a secular religion, totalitarianism is essentially expansionist. It is
missionary in spirit and messianic in aspirations." He develops the theme in Totalitarian
Politics, 82(1) PRoc. M. PHIL. Soc. 1 (1940).
15. In a chapter on The Emotional Structure of Totalitarianism in his OUR Aor OF
UNREASON (1942), Franz Alexander offers profound analysis of the relevant psycho-
logical factors. He summarizes:
"A peculiarly vicious circle in socio dynamics can be observed here. An authoritarian,
state is created which deprives its citizens of self-expression in the interests of economic
competition with other nations. This injury to self-esteem requires aggressive action
and war becomes an inevitable compensation. Diplomatic victories achieved by com-
promise no longer suffice, for the heroic life of conquest and domination for their own
sake and the myth of the superior race are incompatible with anything but martial victory.
In order to make some compensation to those who have lost their normal means of self-
expression, the ideology of the victorious super race was invented. This was an appeal to
the destructive emotional forces in human nature, especially hate, which had been simmer-
ing for years in an impoverished and over-disciplined people who had been forced to
sacrifice butter for guns, individual expression for cringing subordination, self-esteem for
awe, and conscience for blind obedience. This hate was generated in the barracks under
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respect for individual human dignity which even a democratic nation-
state can maintain is in large measure a function of that state's position
in a total world context. When expectations of violence and war are
high, the requirements of self-preservation may move even the best-
intentioned toward a "garrison-prison" state." In the age of the
shattered atom and rumored bacteriological horrors, when all nation-
states are so obsessed by expectations of impending violence that
they must calculate every proposed measure of cooperation about
wealth, enlightenment, or human rights generally in terms of possible
effects on fighting power, it takes no great insight to know that no
people can be secure unless all people are secure and possess all the
conditions of security.
Interdependences comparable to the kind outlined for the world
power process could be indicated for every other world value process.
Documentation could be offered both territorially, with respect to
each value around the globe, and functionally, as between all values. 7
-A few suggestions must suffice. Thus, with respect to wealth, just as
measures for economic improvement must be assayed in terms of their
effects on power, so also because of the demands of people a rising
standard of living everywhere is indispensable to security; and, further,
because the economic cycle is now world-wide in its impact, depression
in any significant area of the world makes it correspondingly difficult
in all other areas to maintain high levels in the production and sharing
of goods and, hence, the conditions under which liberty and human
personality can flourish. Similarly, with respect to enlightenment,
accurate knowledge of other peoples' attitudes, identifications, and
expectations and a clear understanding of world-wide interdependences
are indispensable to rational decisions about security and other values.
Yet in a world increasingly divided and marked off by iron curtains,
it is increasingly difficult for the free peoples of the world to acquire
and spread the enlightenment necessary for rational decision. Finally,
the sadistic drill of the sergeants, in the factories by the abolition of recently acquired
political rights, in a demoralized middle-class which had sunk to the level of the proletariat
and needed someone to look down upon as inferior. The axwakened Frankenstein's mon-
ster of hate must move against the rest of humanity to save the Fuhrer and his small
camarilla from destruction. Hate once mobilized knows no barriers and cares little who
are its victims. If an object is lacking, it may even react against the hater himself and oc-
casion suicide."
16. Lasswell, supra note 11.
In a speech at Monticello on July 4, 1947, President Truman stated: "So long as the
basic rights of man are denied in any substantial portion of the earth, men everywhere must
live in fear of their own rights and their own security." 17 DEP'T STATE Buu.. 80, 81
(1947).
For more detailed discussion of the interdependences of human rights and security, see
Wright, The Rights of Man, 3 U. N. WVFznY Buu.. 777 (1947).
17. For development of the interdependences here sketched see McDougal, supra
note 4.
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coming explicitly to the value respect itself, recent scientific studies
confirm the common-sense notion that the degree to which men are
treated with simple human dignity affects their every response, pre-
disposing them either to violence, war, and revolution or to their ut-
most exertion in the peaceful production of values.1" One of the major
factors in world politics today, affecting all decisions, is the accumu-
lated resentment of countless millions of people, and even whole
nations, arising from long endured discriminations, deprivations, and
humiliations-a resentment capable of being discharged against many
targets, internal and external. 9 It may be recalled also that aggression,
brutality, and violations of human dignity, such as devised by the
Nazis, are as contagious as germs; models of disrespect for human
dignity anywhere in the world can be copied everywhere. It is not too
much, therefore, to summarize that because of man's deep, rising de-
mands for consideration and because of all these interdependences,
a world half-slave and half-free cannot endure.
20
II
It is in the context of these demands and interdependences that the
United Nations program for human rights was conceived and is being
implemented. The structure of obligation assumed in the Charter
18. The classic work for basic principles and history of opinion is DOLLARD, FRUSTRA-
TION AND AGGRESSION (1939). Among the more important experimental studies of the
fundamental significance of the respect factor are those conducted and inspired by Elton
Mayo. For detailed references see MAYO, THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF AN INDUSTRIAL
Cwn izAriox (1945), AND ROErHLISBERGER, MANAGEMENT AND MORALE (1941).
For general background see Sharp, Aggression, 57 ETHICs 1 (1947) ; Chisholm, The
Psychiatry of Enduring Peace, 6 PSYCHIATRY 3 (1946) ; Cook, Democratic Psychology
and a Democratic World Order, 1 WORLD POLITICS 553 (1949) ; GLOVER, WAn, SADISM,
AND PACIFISM (1933); WEST, PSYCHOLOGY AND WORM ORDER (1945), and CoNSCIENCE
AND SocIsrY (1945) ; LASSNVELL, supra note 4; FRoMM, ESCAPE FROM FR EDOM (1941) ;
FLOGEL, MAN, MORALS AND SOCIETY (1945) ; SULLIVAN, CONCEPTIONS OF MODERN Ps,-
cHiATRY (1947) ; KARDiNER, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FRONTIERS OF SOcmTY (1945); II PRoC.
INT. CON i. ON CHILD PSYCHIATRY (1948) for a series of papers on aggression.
19. MACIVER (ED.), CMLIZATION AND GROUP RELATIONSHIPS 40 (1945). ALEXAI-
DER, op. cit. supra note 15, at 211 : "When the organism is frustrated in the gratification of
any of its basic needs, aggressive behavior is the most common response. This is funda-
mentally an attempt to obtain the necessities of life by force."
See also DINGWALL, op. cit. supra note 11; LASSWELL, WORLD PoLTICs AND PERSONAL
INsEcuRrrY, c. 5, Independence Movements: The Demand for Equality (1935) ; BEN DICT,
RACE: SCIENCE AND POLITICS (1943); MACIVER, THE MORE PERFECT UNIoN (1948);
MYRDAL, THE AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944); COX, CASTE, CLASS, AND RACn (1948), with
an introduction by Roucek: "Nothing has been more provocative of international ill will
than problems springing from, and directly and indirectly related to, the phenomena of
caste, class and race." Id. at xxvii.
20. Lewis and Ellingston, introduction to Symposium on Essential -luman Rights, 243
ANNALS (1946) : "A world society possessed of limitless destructive power on wings must
be organized to save the welfare and freedom of the individual human being or it will
destroy itself."
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embraces seven specific references to human rights. As in no like in-
ternational treaty the "people," not the signatory states, of the United
Nations reaffirm their "faith . .. in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in equal rights of men and women .... ," 21 The Pur-
poses and Principles, already referred to,22 which have general applica-
tion to the organization are particularized in the obligation of the
General Assembly to initiate studies and make recommendations for
the purpose of "promoting international cooperation in the economic,
social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." 23 This undertaking
is reiterated in Article 55 of Chapter LX, which concerns international
economic and social cooperation. The obligation which looks to "the
creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary
for peaceful and friendly relations among nations" binds both the
General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council 24 in clearly
mandatory language 25 to promoting "universal respect for, and
obser-ance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." 1 Like the General
Assembly, the Economic and Social Council is also empowered to make
recommendations to promote respect and "observance of" human
rights,2 and to establish commissions for their promotion.2 The
"basic objectives" of the trusteeship system are to "encourage respect
for human rights" (and also to encourage, it should be noted, "recogni-
tion of the interdependence of the peoples of the world.") - Not only
are the various organs of the United Nations thus heavily obligated to
satisfy demands for human rights, but the member states signatory
21. U. N. CHARTFa, Preamble, supra note 6.
22. See supra note 10.
23. U. N. CHARTER Art 13 (1) (b).
24. Id. Art. 60. "Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organization
set forth in this Chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority
of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council, which shall have for this
purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X."
25. Id. Art. 55: ... . The United Nations shall promote... ." (italics supplied).
26. Id. Art. 55. This Article along with Articles 13 and 62 was enlarged in the course
of the San Francisco Conference to include a broader emphasis on human rights than had
originally been the case in the provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. See 11 D&,"T
STATE BuL.r 368; REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OI" THE RESULTS OF THE SAN FAi-cscso
CONFERE.NcE Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 53, 102, 105, 108, 112-20 (1945).
The italicized words were added "to strengthen the statement by making it clear that
something more than formal respect for the rights and freedoms in question is demanded."
GOODRICH AND HANR, op. cit. supra note 7, at 322.
27. U. N. CHARmE Art. 62.
28. Id. Art. 68. The Commission on Human Rights is one of the few commissions
expressly authorized by the Charter.
29. Id. Art. 76
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to the Charter directly bind themselves. Article 56 provides "[AIll
members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes
set forth in Article 55." These purposes it will be recalled include
promoting "observance of" as well as general respect for human rights.
The execution of this program finds partial expression in the Geno-
cide Convention,3" the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,"1 the
currently proposed International Covenant of Human Rights, 2 and
in various suggested measures for implementation and enforcement."3
The Genocide Convention and the Declaration of Human Rights, the
one a treaty to be ratified, the other a declaration of policy and public
affirmation addressed to member states, were approved by the General
Assembly in December, 1948.11 The Convention seeks to eradicate
the ultimate deprivation of human rights: the destruction of national,
ethnical, racial, or religious groups "as such." '1 Inspired by frightful
Nazi precedents, it prohibits not only the killing of members of a
group on racial or other grounds but also the imposition of destruc-
tive conditions of life, the prevention of births, and other measures
directed toward group extermination.3" The scope of the Convention
extends to public officials and rulers, as well as to private individ-
uals,37 all of whom may in addition to the crime of genocide be indicted
for conspiracy, attempt, and complicity in respect to genocide, and for
"incitement" of the crime.3 s Enforcement involves the undertaking
by signatories to incorporate this newly devised international crime
into domestic law,39 and to submit disputes as to interpretation, appli-
30. See Dep't State Pub. No. 3416"(1949).
31. See Dep't State Pub. No. 3381 (1949).
32. See REPORT OF THE FIFTH SESSION OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, May 9-June 20, 1949, U. N. Doc. E/1371, Antex I.
33. Id. Annex III. Various other activities of the United Nations on behalf of human
rights are omitted from the present discussion. Such activities include, among others, the
work of the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and the Press; the Commission
on the Status of Women; the Trusteeship System; the Sub-Commission on the Prevention
of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, etc. .For a brief survey see UNITED
NATIONS, FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1948), and current issues of UNITED
NATIONS BULLETIN. See also REPORT OF THE FIFTH SESSION OF THE COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, .upra note 32.
34. See U. N. Documents Nos. A/PV 179 (December 9, 1948), and A/PV 183 (De-
cember 10, 1948). There were no abstentions and none opposed to the Genocide Conven-
tion. A/PV 179, p. 70. The Declaration was also unanimously approved, but with eight
abstentions: Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, South Africa,
Soviet Russia, Yugo-Slavia. A/PV 183, p. 161-165.
35. GENOCIDE CONVENTION Art. II. See generally Comment, Genocide: A Coin tun.
tary on the Convention, 58 YALE L. J. 1142 (1949).
36. GENOCIDE CONVENTION Art. II.
37. Id. Art. IV.
38. Id. Art. III.
39. Id. Art. V.
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cation, or fulfillment to the International Court of Justice. 0 Other
organs of the United Nations-the General Assembly, the Security
Council-may be called upon to consider action for prevention or
suppression of the crime .41And it is contemplated that upon the
establishment of an international penal tribunal persons charged with
genocide may be brought before it, provided jurisdiction of such a
court has been recognized by the contracting states. 
42
The Declaration, in contrast, does not purport to be an enforceable
covenant, 43 nor is it designed to suppress a particular offense; it is a
general expression of world policy as to civil and social rights, a policy
of which the Genocide Convention is a striking application. It is a
declaration of past achievement and future aspiration 44 and comprises
the first step in the creation of an International Bill of Human Rights,
a tripartite program to include ultimately conventions imposing in-
ternational obligation for enforcement on both the domestic and
international level. The product of compromise necessitated by wide
divergence in economic resources available to fulfill its moral commit-
ments 45 and in emphasis with respect to relation between citizen and
state,4 the Declaration provides for three basic types of rights: civil
liberties and political rights; economic and social rights; and inter-
national rights. The first of these extends to personal liberties, in-
cluding among others freedom and security of the person, freedom of
thought, religion, assembly, etc.,47 as well as the political right to par-
ticipate in government on an equal basis; 48 while the second category
includes the right to social security, work, and choice of employment,
and to education, leisure, and an adequate standard of living." The
rights to nationality, freedom of transit, and political asylum comprise
the third category. 5 Limited as it is to moral suasion, the Declaration
nevertheless occupies a powerful political position; it commands the
attention of world public opinion.
40. Id. Art. IX.
41. Id. Art. VIII.
42. Id. Art. VI.
43. See REPORT oF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE Eco ".oc A-.D
SOCIAL COUNCIL ON THE SECOND SESSION OF THE COMMISSION, December 2-17, 1947,
U. N. Doc. E/600, p. 19; Report of the Working Group, id. at 36, 37; Comments by United
Kingdom Representative, U. N. Doc. E/CN 4/82 Add. 9, 1948, p. 2; see Hendrick, Prog-
ress Report on Human Rights, 19 DEP'T STATE BULL. 159, 160 (1948).
44. See Preamble, supra note 31.
45. See Martin, The Universal Declaratio of Human Rights, 3 WoRLD AFFAs 292,
297 (1949).
46. Id. at 296; see Malik, Intenzational Bill of Human Rights, 5 U. N. BuLl. 519, 521
(1948).
47. THE DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS Arts. 3-20.
48. Id. Art.21.
49. Id. Arts. 22-29.
50. Id. Arts. 13-15.
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Of more immediate importance from a legal point of view is the
Covenant, presently in draft form for presentation to the Economic
and Social Council.5' Like the Charter and the Genocide Convention
it is conceived as a treaty committing signatories to specific obligations.
Its substantive provisions,5 2 for the most part the same as Articles 2-20
of the Declaration,53 extend to protection of life and liberty," against
torture, mutilation, and slavery; 11 of freedom of religion and thought,,'
of speech, assembly, and association." The alien is protected against
arbitrary expulsion; 11 and equal protection before the law, as well as
with respect to all rights defined by the Covenant, is accorded to all.,69
Imprisonment for debt is prohibited,"0 as are ex post facto laws 11 and
restrictions upon the movement of persons within a state.12 Particular
emphasis is given the rights of the accused, both while under prelim-
inary detention as well as in the course of subsequent trial. Such
persons are accorded the right to a proceeding in the nature of a habeas
corpus, notice of the charge, and a speedy termination of detention. 3
There is explicit provision in the case of both civil and criminal offenses
for a "fair and public trial," the right to counsel, confrontation by
witnesses, compulsory attendance of witnesses, and, finally, for the
right of presumed innocence.64 Signatories of this treaty-which has
application to public officials and private individuals as well as to
states 1"-would be obligated to make these provisions part of domestic
law.6 Beyond this the means of enforcement as an international meas-
ure is still a subject of debate within the Commission on Human
Rights.61 Whether the Covenant is intended to be self-executing
51. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, U. N. Doc. E/1371, ,supra
note 32. Both the draft Covenant and the proposals on implementation have been sent to
member governments for comment and are thereafter to be considered by the Economic
and Social Council. See U. N. Doc. E/CN 4/191 (May 31, 1949).
52. See Part II, Draft Covenant of Human Rights.
53. The exceptions are the right to privacy, asylum, nationality, and private property,
Arts. 12, 14, 15, and 17 of the Declaration.
54. COVENANT Art. 5.
55. Id. Arts. 6, 7, and 8.
56. Id. Art. 16.
57. Id. Arts. 17-19.
58. Id. Art. 12.
59. Id. Art. 20.
60. Id. Art. 10.
61. Id. Art. 14.
62. Id. Art. 11.
63. Id. Art. 9.
64. Id. Art. 13.
65. Id. Art. 2.
66. Ibid.
67. The Commission has barely broached its agenda on this subject. For discussion in
the Fifth Session of the Commission (May-June 1949) see U. N. Documents E/CN4/SR
105, E/CN4/SR 111, E/CN4/SR 114, E/CN4/SR 115, E/CN4/SR 118, E/CN4/SR 119,
E/CN4/SR 132, E/CN4/133; also E/1371, supra note 32.
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remains at present in doubt also.6" In this respect, as in respect to the
general war suspension clause 11 and certain other provisions," the
Covenant remains incomplete.
On the details of implementation the Commission has reached
agreement on only one--an obvious-point, namely, that states shall
be permitted to initiate complaints for enforcement, whatever the
form of implementation finally adopted.7' In the fifth session in May-
June, 1949, the right of petition by individuals, groups, or organiza-
tions was discussed but not agreed upon, the consensus being that
further study of the problem of handling such petitions was needed.7 2
As to the requisite type of enforcement machinery, extensive sug-
gestions have been made, running between the extremes of conserva-
tive American-British and radical Australian proposals. The former,
excluding individual petition by providing for reference to the Inter-
national Court of Justice,7" envisages public protest and direct nego-
68. See Arts. 2 and 24. No definitive text for either article has been decided upon by
the Commission, though Art. 2 has been provisionally adopted pending completion of Part
II of the Covenant. The American proposal that Article 2 should contain language to the
effect that "The provisions of this Covenant shall not themselves become effective as do-
mestic law," was rejected by the Commission (see E/CN4/SR 125, 22 June 1949). As it
now stands paragraph 1 of the Article 2 reads: "Each state party hereto undertales to
ensure to all individuals within its jurisdiction the rights defined in this Covenant. Where
not already provided by legislative or other measures, each State undertakes, in accordance
with its constitutional processes and in accordance with the provisions of this Covenant,
to adopt within a reasonable time such legislative or other measures to give effect to the
rights defined in this Covenant." E/1371, p. 28.
69. Art. 4.
70. Concerning Part I the Commission has decided to postpone consideration of the
Preamble and Article 1 until the completion of Part II, or until, as in the case of Article
3, implementation measures are considered. Articles 2 and 4 have been provisionally
adopted pending completion of Part II. Discussion of Article 17 in Part II has been post-
poned until the SLxth Session of the Commission, and Article 21 until Article 17 is con-
sidered. Of Part III, only Article 23 dealing with ratification and accession has been
completed. Numerous texts for the remaining three Articles are included in the Report
of the Commission to the Economic and Social Council. See U. N. Document E/1371,
Annex L
Even the substantive terms of Part II still seem in question. See Draft Resolution,
under the heading "Draft International Covenant on Human Rights," submitted by the
Commission to the Council, requesting information on U. N. activities involving economic
and social rights (Articles 22-27 of the Declaration) "for the purpose of enabling the
Commission to determine what actions it should take in these fields...." U. N. Docu-
ment E/1371, Annex IV.
Art. 7 which deals with prohibitions against scientific and medical experimentation
has been sent for comment to the World Health Organization. See E/1371, Annex III,
p. 30.
71. U. N. Doc. E/CN4/SR 114-115; E/1371, p. 15.
72. U. N. Doc. E/CN4/SR 115, 118, 119, 132, 133; E/1371, p. 19.
73. Art. 34 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides: "I. Only
states may be parties in cases before the Court.' Dep't State Pub. No. 236S, Conference
Series 76.
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tiation by a complaining state, in addition to hearings and investigation
by a specially appointed United Nations Committee.74 The latter
calls for an International Court of Human Rights." At the request
of the Commission, member governments are presently considering
all alternatives of implementation, whether eventually to be effected
through provision in the Covenant itself,76 or by appended protocol,"
or through a separate convention as originally intended.',
It is regrettable that in terms of content the Covenant as presently
drafted falls far short of the promise of the Declaration. It neither
guarantees participation in government, the sine qua non of freedom,
nor stipulates any aspirations about that economic well-being upon
which today depends the fulfillment in fact of any human rights.
III
The principal attack from within the United States upon this pro-
gram of the United Nations has come from certain leaders of the Amer-
ican Bar Association, notably President Holman and ex-President
Rix. 9 Though characterized more by rambling fulmination and quib-
74. See U. N. Doc. E/CN4/274/Rev. 1 (May 31, 1949); also the earlier Chinese-
U. S. Proposal on Implementation which is substantially the same, though less detailed.
E/CN4/145 (June 16, 1948).
75. See E/CN4/AG1/27 (May 10, 1948); also E/1371, p. 61. Other suggestions
have been put forward by France: E/CN4/147, 1948; E/CN4/82/Add. 10, 1948;
E/CN4/82/Add. 10/R. 1, 1949; E/1371, p. 70; by India: E/CN4/151 (amendment to
Chinese-U. S. Proposals); E/CN4/153 (June 21, 1948) ; E/1371, p. 77; by Guatemala:
E/CN4/293, E/1371, p. 75. See also Report of Working Group on Implementation E/600,
p. 33 et seq. (Dec. 1947). The conclusion drawn by Russia relative to the various pro-
posals is that they seek to engender systems of international pressure; to interfere with
the internal affairs of States in conflict with the "whole system of international public
law"; and to transform disputes between individuals into disputes between States. For
these reasons all the proposals are considered unsatisfactory. See USSR Statenpent,
E/CN4/154 (June 24, 1948) ; also in E/1371, p. 78.
76. The current U. S. view. SeeE/CN4/SR 111.
77. Ibid.
78. See Malik, id. at 6.
79. Holman, "An International Bill of Rights": Proposals Have Dangerous JIplica-
tions for U. S., 34 A.B.A.J. 984 (1948), cited hereinafter as "Holman article," and Presi-
dent Holman's Comments on Mr. Moskowitzs Reply, 35 A.B.A.J. 201 (1949), cited here-
inafter as "Holman reply"; Rix, Humnan Rights and International La': Effect of the
Covenant Under Our Constitution, 35 A.B.A.J. 551 (1949), cited hereinafter as "Rix"
(first delivered as an address to the annual meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law in Washington on April 29, 1949). For other references to the human rights
program see Editorial, The Declaration and the Covenant, 35 A.B.A.J. 40-41 (1949)-
Report of the Committee for Peace and Law, presented to the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association, and comments thereon, 35 A.B.A.J. 196 (1949) ; Mr. Holman's
remarks in "President's Page," 35 A.B.A.J. 201-202 (1949); Wyman, Editorial, Hunaft
Rights and the Declaration, 35 A.B.A.J. 406-408 (1949). See also Universal Hunan
Rights, 34 MAss. L. Q. 45-84 (1949).
The views expressed are uniform in their opposition to the program. The decision of
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bling questioning than by direct assertion which could be controverted,
this attack may be said in reasonable summary to emphasize three
main points. 8 The first charge is that the United Nations program for
human rights is an invasion of the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States and other nations that has nothing to do with the maintenance
of peace or any other matter of legitimate international concern. The
second is that United States' participation in this program is uncon-
stitutional and beyond the scope of the treaty or other federal power,
since the program deals with matters more of state and local than of
international or even national concern. The final charge is that United
States' participation in the program is dangerously impolitic for a
variety of reasons, the most important of which is that the program
embodies an awesome threat to our free-enterprise system and form
of government, stemming from economic reformers, professors, and
Mrs. Roosevelt.81
The "domestic jurisdiction" charge is developed in various ways.
Both Mr. Holman 82 and Mr. Rix 83 invoke Article 2, paragraph 7
of the United Nations Charter, which reads in part: "Nothing con-
tained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present charter. ... " 84 To bring
human rights within this reservation and exclude them from inter-
national concern, Mr. Holman insists that "the whole purpose of the
United Nations is to achieve peace" and that the maintenance of
peace and preservation of human rights are separate problems, sug-
gesting that neither of "the world wars were caused by the absence of
an International Bill of Rights or primarily by subnormal or abnormal
conditions in any country" and that at the time of launching these
wars Germany "had the most advanced social and economic program
the President and Board of Governors of the Association to promote a campaign of study
of the proposals through regional meetings, study groups, and conferences--see 35 A.B.A.J.
40 (1949)--seems hardly to have evoked the enlightened discussion expected.
For answer to the bar leaders see Moskowitz, Is the U. A.s Bill of Human Rights
Dangerous? A Reply to President Holnan, 35 A.B.A.J. 283 (1949).
80. If it be objected that our summary makes the bar leaders' attack too forthright,
our query is then: what do they mean?
81. 'e are dealing with a missionary spirit on the part of social and economic re-
formers to establish throughout the world their social and economic ideas... ." Holman
article, 985.
"She [Irs. Roosevelt] and a few others, including Professor Jessup, have undertaken
to bind the American people without their knowledge and consent." Holman reply, 290.
82. Holman article, 1080, 985.
83. Rix, 618.
84. The omitted words are: "but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII."
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of any nation in the World." 87 He insists further that the United
Nations is primarily "an organization of states," operating "on an
international level with government meeting government," while a
"bill of rights, on the other hand, has nothing to do directly with the
relations between governments; it exists primarily to define the rela-
tions between a government or state and the individual citizens thereof;
basically it relates to internal affairs and not to international mat-
ters." 86 In a declaration before the House of Delegates of the Bar
Association Mr. Holman summarizes: "For the first time we have the
proposals to take away from our people, their state and local govern-
ment, and their national government as well, their control over the
matters which have always been 'of domestic jurisdiction.' " 11 Mr.
Rix's contribution to this point is to ride hard the nineteenth century
canards that "international law is the law of states and their relations
to each other, with all enforcement and negotiations in the states
alone" and that it is inappropriate for international law to purport to
concern itself with the relations between a nation-state and its cit-
izens."' He asserts that the "reservation of domestic questions, known
as Article 2 (7), is perfectly plain and concise" and that despite all the
provisions in the United Nations Charter which call for "promoting,
assisting, encouraging, recommending the cause of human rights,"
there has been no "creation of any contractual liability for recognition
of human rights by any state." 89
The constitutional argument is more evasive, taking the form largely
of vague questions. Thus, Mr. Rix inquires, quite irrelevantly to any
question of constitutional power to secure human rights, "Is there no
limit to the power of Congress acting under a treaty except that of
prohibition in the Constitution," and, as if he were asking something
new and unanswered, "Shall the treaty-making power be used as the
basis for enactment of domestic legislation in the United States," and
"What is the effect of treaty law as domestic law of the land, as supreme
law under the Constitution." 90 Though he is nowhere explicit about
limitations on the treaty power or other federal power over foreign
affairs, Mr. Rix quotes with approval the well-known address of Chief
Justice Hughes which distinguishes agreements, relating to "the
conduct of our international relations" from those which do not "per-
tain to our external relations" but rather to matters "normally and
appropriately" within "the local jurisdictions of the states," and as-
sumes, without halting for reflection on the question of fact, that "the
85. Holman article, 985.
86. Ibid.
87. Comment by Mr. Holman before the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association, January 31, 1949. See 35 A.B.A.J. 196 (1949).
88. Rix, 552.
89. Id..at 618.
90. Id. at 552.
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wise words of Chief Justice Hughes" give sufficient answer to the ques-
tion whether the treaty-making power shall be used as the basis for
enactment of domestic legislation on human rights.0' Referring to a
suggestion of the President's Committee on Civil Rights that the
treaty-making power might be so used, he finds that the "road to fed-
eral absolutism, is being made very, very easy." 02 Missouri v. l6-
land,93 in which Justice Holmes delivered his famous and statesman-
like opinion on the scope of the treaty power, is described as the case
"in which Leviathan, with deep concern for the food supply of wild
duck for a suffering people, blithely asserted that there is no limit in
the United States to the treaty-making power and legislation enacted
thereon unless it is prohibited by the Constitution." 01 Fearing the
"destruction of a cherished system of our division of powers of govern-
ment," 9-1 Mr. Rix has this to say of the potentialities of the Genocide
Convention and of the proposed Covenant on Human Rights: "...
there may be created, as law, a third body of treaty law in this country
with no constitutional basis whatsoever, of equal dignity with the
Constitution, as supreme law of the land, superseding all state con-
stitutions, decisions and laws of the states covering the same subjects,
and probably superior to all prior enacted laws of Congress on the
subject." 9, The consequences of this "in a field which has been almost
exclusive [sic] in the states, is so far-reaching ...that the word
revolutionary is not fully descriptive." 11 Mr. Holman also thinks this
"dangerous." -s The problem is considered aggravated by Supreme
Court decisions dealing with centralization of federal power, by the
recent restrictive covenant cases, and by the lack of uniformity in
state anti-discriminatory employment legislation. With respect to
restrictive covenants Mr. Holman urges, despite the Supreme Court
ruling that they are not enforceable, that "the United States should
not subscribe to setting aside what has been long established and
recognized as a proper restriction with respect at least to limited areas
of property." 19 In any event Mr. Holman, apparently hopeful, sug-
gests these cases may be overruled."'0 A minor constitutional theme,
much emphasized, is that in international undertakings of this kind
this country is peculiarly vulnerable since, in contrast with the further
action required in most countries, under Article VI (2) of our Constitu-
91. Id. at 554, 618.
92. Id. at 618.
93. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). See infra, Section V.
94. Id. at 554.
95. Id. at 552.
96. Id. at 554.
97. Ibid.
98. Holman article, 1081.
99. Id. at 1079.
100. Ibd.
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tion self-executing treaties upon ratification immediately become the
law of the land-apparently irrevocably, since "this country is not in
the habit of ratifying treaties with the intention of repudiation." 101
The final charge that the human rights program is dangerously
impolitic for the United States is made explicit enough. Its general
tenor, repeated over and over, is that the provisions of the Declaration
and proposed Covenant in so far as they are traditional are vague and
unnecessary and likely to expose us to a "Pandora's box of complaints"
from within and without, and in so far as they are not traditional are
long steps toward "world-wide socialism," if not communism. 102 Thus,
in strong isolationist vein Mr. Holman asserts that we risk "many
international irritations and provocations" from "United Nations
intervention in the domestic affairs of Nations." 103 If, he develops his
theme, "the United Nations, through its own interpretation, is the
final arbiter of what constitutes a matter of international concern
then by its ipse dixit, the acts of our citizens, our courts and our public
officials will be amenable to examination and condemnation and
eventual control by the United Nations." 104 Worse still, "both in-
dividuals and pressure groups in other countries, even in Russia, could
have a Roman holiday in asking American cities and states, and even
our federal Government, for extended explanations regarding the
observance and protection by them of so-called human rights with
respect to our own citizens." 105 "I leave to your imagination," states
Mr. Rix, "as to what would happen in the field of administration of
municipal law if subversive elements should teach minorities that the
field of civil rights and laws had been removed to the field of inter-
national law. . . .', "I The introduction of the principle of individual
as against state responsibility into international law will inevitably
create "correlative rights and privileges .. .to an utterly unknown
degree." 107 The charge that the program will promote "state socialism,
if not communism, throughout the world" 10I is supported by allega-
tions that it will foster "economic and social boons, bounties and
benefits" which encourage a "planned economy or welfare state," 109
that it is "paternalistic" and "minimizes the incentive for initiative
and progress," 110 and that it emphasizes "rights" but not "respon-
sibility." 111 From a view, as parochial as unrealistic, it is urged that
101. Rix, 554. See also, Holman reply, 360.
102. Holman article, 1080, 985. Holman reply, 290.
103. Holman article, 985.
104. Holman reply, 290.
105. Id. at 361.
106. Rix, 554.
107. Ibid.
108. Holman article, 1080.
109. Report of the Committee on Peace and Law, 35 A.B.A.J. 196 (1949).
110. Holman article, 1080.
111. Wyman, Human Rights and the Declaration, 35 A.B.A.J. 406, 408 (1949).
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foreign standards of human rights (impliedly, without qualification,
inferior to ours) will be enforced against us to the detriment of our
own Bill of Rights; and, conversely, that while human rights in the
United States are God-given and inalienable, peoples abroad are not
so endowed and should not have human rights imposed on them.112
One crowning non-sequitur is the argument that omission from the
Covenant of any right deemed essential, the right to own property
for instance (a right included in the Declaration), automatically
limits the exercise of that right in the United States." 3 A prominent
and recurrent emphasis is that we must go slow, that international
law is not made "in the twinkling of an eye," that it is better to await
the !"evolutionary process of building customary law" and not use
that prime instrument of international legislation, agreement, or
treaty, which is described as "summary process." 114
IV
The recital in Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter that
"nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit
such matters to settlement under the present charter" is, despite the
contrary allegations of the bar leaders, utterly irrelevant to any issues
posed for either the United States or any other nation-state by the
proposed Covenant on Human Rights and the Genocide Convention.
This limitation in the Charter, whatever meaning may eventually be
ascribed to it or whoever may eventually be decided to have power to
interpret it,1'5 is a limitation only on the organization set up by the
Charter and upon activities which depend upon the Charter for their
constitutional base." 6 The proposed Covenant on Human Rights and
112. Remarks of Mr. George A. Finch at the 1949 meeting of the American Society of
International Law, which will appear in the 1949 Proceedings of the Society. See also
Wyman, supra note 111, at 407.
113. Holman article, 986.
114. Rix, 551.
115. For a brief indication of the variety of opinion on these points see GooDRnCr AND
HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UxInED NATIONS: COM ENTARy AND DocUMst.,Ts 110 C1 scq.
(Rev. ed. 1949).
Among the more useful discussions of Article 2(7), putting it in proper perspective,
are Goodrich, The United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction, 3 Nr. ORG. 14 (1949);
FrNcHm, Do ESTIc JURiSDIcTIO, (1948) ; Gross, Impact of 1he Unitcd Nations upon
Domestic Jurisdiction, 18 DEPT STATE BULL 259 (1948); Note, 47 CoL. L. Rnv. 268
(1947).
116. The assurances, therefore, of Mr. Stettinius that domestic questions were reserved
at San Francisco-assurances upon which. Mr. Rix heavily relies (see Ri,, 618)-are
irrelevant in so far as the substance of the Covenant and the Genocide Convention is con-
cerned. Referring to the enlargement of the scope of Art. 2, paragraph 7, to cover "activi-
ties of the organization as a whole, instead of limiting it to the pacific settlement of
disputes as had been proposed at Dumbarton Oaks," Mr. Stettinius stated that "the possi-
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the Genocide Convention are to be new agreements, stemming from the
same nation-state power, "the competence attached to sovereignty," 117
that established the United Nations Charter and which remains
competent to clarify or supplement the obligations assumed in that
Charter to promote respect for and observance of human rights.
There is nothing in the United Nations Charter or in any other inter-
national agreement or in customary international law which derogates
in the slightest degree from the power and competence of the members
of the United Nations to make further agreements about human
rights and to establish common standards, to whatever extent desired,
about practices within their respective jurisdictions, "domestic" or
otherwise."n The obvious and fundamental principle of customary
law is well stated by Sir Arnold McNair: ". . . international law
regards a State as being invested for international purposes with
complete power-vis--vis another contracting party-to alienate
or otherwise affect the rights of its nationals, both property and per-
sonal, and to impose liabilities upon them." 19 More affirmatively, it
bility is now definitely excluded" that "the Economic and Social Council could interfere
directly in the domestic economy, social structure, or cultural or educational arrangements
of the member States." REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE REsULTs OF TIHE SAN FRAN-
Cisco CONFERENCE, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1945).
Compare the official remarks of Committee 11/3 at San Francisco relating to the ob-
jectives of the Economic and Social Council:
"There were some misgivings that the statement of purposes now recommended im-
plied that the Organization might interfere in the domestic affairs of member countries.
To remove all possible doubt, the Committee agreed to include in its records the following
statement:
"'The members of Committee 3 of Commission II are in full agreement that nothing
contained in Chapter IX [International Economic and Social Cooperation] can be construed
as giving authority to the Organization to intervene in the domestic affairs of member
States.' (Italics supplied.)
"The Committee agreed that it was desirable to reinforce the statement of purposes
by a pledge on the part of individnal members. The precise wording of the pledge was
extensively debated and the form finally agreed upon reads as follows:
"'All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with
the Organization for the achievement of these purposes.'" 8 DOCUMENTs OF TElE UNIrtD
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANClSCO, 1945, 81-82
(1945). (Italics supplied.)
See also the decision that it is for the Organization to "promote" human rights, but
for the States to "protect" them, except where "rights and freedoms are grievously out-
raged so as to create conditions which threaten peace or obstruct the applications of pro-
visions of the Charter," when they cease to be the sole concern of each State. 6 id. at
705.
117. The phrase is Oppenheim's. 1 OPPENHF.IM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 795 (Lauter-
pacht ed. 1948).
118. The general point is well developed by Charles Fahy, then Legal Adviser of the
Department of State, in discussing comparable problems raised by the International Trade
Organization Charter in Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance, Part 1, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1947).
119. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 335 (1938). Cf. OPPENnE m, op. cit. supra note
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is uniformly established by authority as high as the Permanent Court
of International Justice that nation-states may by agreement take
matters, such as nationality, out of what might otherwise be regarded
as "domestic jurisdiction" and make them of international concern
and subject to international regulation. 12 If, finally, the inspiring
words, so many times repeated, of the United Nations Charter are
not to be taken as sheer mockery and humbuggery of the peoples of
the world, that Charter itself, with its clear statement of major pur-
pose and several undertakings, must be construed, not as precluding
member states from further concern and agreement about human
rights, but rather as obligating them to such action.
It cannot in fact be disguised, by any amount of reverent invocation
of irrelevant technicalities, that the real issue posed for the United
States, as for every other nation-state, is the policy issue: whether it
should enter into new agreements of the type proposed. '2 1 The critical
117, at 804. Potter, Inhibitions Upon the Treaty-Making Power of the United States, 28
Am. J. INTL L. 456,463 (1934) writes:
"[I]nternational law bestows a plenary power of concluding treaties upon every State.
A priori, and in the absence of any valid restrictions of a special nature arising from
either national or international sources, the power of the United States and of its treaty-
making agency to conclude agreements with other states which are mutually acceptable
to both is unlimited, in terms of either subject matter or of type of treatment for that
subject matter to be provided in the agreement, assuming freedom from the exercise
of force or fraud upon the negotiators at the time of concluding the treaty. Such plenary
power continues to accompany, or stand back of, and possibly exceed, the degree of treaty-
making power purporting to be granted by the national constitution. The making of
treaties by the states antedated the formation of modem international law, and the latter
emerged as a result of that process, but today it is international law which sustains treaty-
making, and that in plenary degree."
120. Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, Permanent Court of International Justice,
1923, Publications of the Court, Ser. B, No. 4 (Advisory Opinion) (1923) ; see also Ger-
man Settlers in Poland, P.C..J., Ser. B, No. 7, p. 16 (1923); Case Concerning Certain
German Interests in Upper Silesia, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 6, pp. 14, 15 (1925); Treatment
of Polish Nationals . . . in Danzig Territory, P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B, No. 44, p. 42. Cf.
JE-sup, A MODERN LAw oF NArioNs 87 (1948).
121. This is the issue even if one assumes, as the bar leaders insist, that Article 2(7) of
the United Nations Charter is relevant and that for the purposes of that Article the United
States is the exclusive judge of what is within its domestic jurisdiction. The United
States must still determine what it will consider within its domestic jurisdiction.
With the bar leaders' horror of the suggestion that the interpretation of Article 2(7)
may be a matter of international concern, may be contrasted Judge Hudson's strictures on
this same article in The World Court: America's Declaration Accepting Jurisdiction, 32
AXB.AJ. 832, 835 (1946) : "This text marks a distinct retrogression. Unlike that in the
Covenant, and unlike the previous Declarations accepting the Permanent Court's jurisdic-
tion, it provides no competent forum for the determination of the question whether a mat-
ter is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
The insight and vision of earlier bar leaders with respect to the comparable problem
of the jurisdiction of the International Court are indicated in Hudson, supra; Preuss,
Questions Resulting from the Connally Amendment, 32 A.B.A.J. 660 (1946), and Juris-
diction of World Court: Reasons for Urging a Arew American Declaration, 33 A.B.A.J.
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question in simplest terms is whether or not the human rights and
security, in the sense of freedom to pursue all values by democratic
procedures, of the people of the United States, and of any other peoples
with whom they identify, are sufficiently at stake to justify the United
States in assuming obligations of the kind proposed in return for other
nation-states assuming reciprocal obligations. Rational answer to
this question depends, not upon exercises in authoritative doctrine,
but upon correct orientation in realm of fact-in the realm of present
degrees of, and probable future trends in, interdependence among the
peoples of the world with respect to human rights and security. Mr.
Holman's insistence upon the separateness of the problems of human
rights and peace, with documentation by reference to the course of
Nazi Germany, suggests a very considerable disorientation. Because
of the demands, conditions, and trends indicated in the introductory
paragraphs of this article, we prefer to take our stand with the great
bulk of mankind-witness the general consciousness pervading not
only the declarations of war aims and the framing of the United Nations
organization and its subsidiaries, but also the subsequent pronounce-
ments and practices of the United Nations agencies and the late frantic
scrambling for regional pacts and associations-who see both a general,
irrevocable interdependence of all peoples everywhere as to all values
and a specific connection between the internal tyranny of nation-states
and their external aggression.1
22
For resolution of the issue of policy thus posed for the United States
and other nation-states, one fact at least is certain: there is nothing
in the technical concept "domestic jurisdiction," whether considered
generally or as put forward in the United Nations Charter, that offers
any guidance. The words "domestic jurisdiction" are neither possessed
of any intrinsic or absolute meaning nor are they self-defining.
12
1
Neither official pronouncement nor practice of states has ever given
them a very precise meaning for any purpose, much less of relevance
to rational action about human rights in the contemporary world.'
4
Introduced into the Covenant of the League of Nations on the sugges-
tion of American statesmen in the vain hope of appeasing isolationist
sentiment, this "mischievous phrase" has, in the apt description of a
distinguished critic, 12 5 become a "new catchword" or verbal "idol"
430 (1947) ; Withdrawal of Connally Amendment as to the World Court is Urged, 34
A.B.A.J. 186, 256 (1948).
122. It surely cannot be seriously suggested that Russia's systematic exclusions from
access to political power, repression of all opposition, and iron-curtain policy with respect
to enlightenment have no bearing on her foreign policy or her peoples' willingness to ac-
cept that policy.
123. Cf. Preuss, The International Court of Justice, 40 Am. J. INAT' L. 720, 726 (1946).
124. FiNCHrAM, op. cit. supra note 115, offers complete review.
125. Professor James L. Brierly. His early article, from which the quotations are
taken, Matters of Domestic Jurisdiction, 6 Bar. Y. B. INT'L L. 8 (1925), is still the most
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to serve the same old function that words like "sovereignty," "in-
dependence," and "state equality" have so long served. That function
is much too often to put a stop to thought, to summarize conclusions
reached on unexpressed or perhaps even unexamined or unconscious
grounds, and to assert arbitrary refusal to negotiate or cooperate on
problems regarded by other states as of common concern. When
definition is proferred by disinterested authority, it is invariably cast
in terms of relativity. 26 Thus, the Permanent Court in a much quoted
passage asserted: "The question whether a certain matter is or is not
solely within the jurisdiction of a state is essentially a relative question;
it depends upon the development of international relations." 127 Such
definition obviously merely restates the question of the facts about
world-wide interdependence. It may be instructive to note that in all
the discussion that attended the framing of Article 2(7) of the United
Nations Charter very little effort was devoted to clarifying the mean-
ing of the limitation proposed for the organization. The record of San
Francisco reveals (1) a design to extend the scope of paragraph 7
(limited in Dumbarton Oaks to the pacific settlement of disputes) to
all the organs and activities of the United Nations, (2) a considerable
diversity of opinion as to who should interpret the paragraph, (3) a
belief that "essentially" is broader than the League word "solely,"
and (4) some notion that traditional international law is too vague
and antiquated to assist in definition; but there is practically no dis-
cussion of what in substance constitutes "matters essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state." 121 There is evidence indeed of
deliberate intent to postpone clarification for the future development
of practice. Thus, Mr. Dulles for the United States, in rejecting the
standard of international law, "pointed out that international law was
subject to constant change and therefore escaped definition," and
insisted that "it would, in any case, be difficult to define whether or
not a given situation came within the domestic jurisdiction of a
state." 129 "In this era," the official paraphrase continues, "the whole
internal life of a country was affected by foreign conditions." The
record reads: 1
"In summary, Mr. Dulles stressed the virtues of the principle-
its breadth and its simplicity. The Organization in none of its
incisive analysis. For later developments see Bentwich, Thc Limits of the Domestic luris-
diction of the State, 31 Ta. OF THE GRorIus Socmrry 59 (1945); Davies, Domestic Juris-
diction, 32 TR. OF T HE GRornus Socrnry 60 (1946).
126. FiNCHAm, op. cit. supra note 115, at 40.
127. Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, supra note 120.
128. Fin cAm., op. cit. stpra note 115, at 147. See 6 DocumEnts or Tn UMrTE NTA-
TIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANcisco, 1945, 507-513,
110-111 (1945) ; also REPORT To THE PREsmEr, suipra note 116, at 26, 57-58.
129. 6 DocumENTs, supra note 128, at 508.
130. Ibid.
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branches or organs should intervene in what was essentially the
domestic life of the member states. Moreover, this principle was
subject to evolution. The United States had had long experience
in dealing with a parallel problem, i.e., the relationship between
the forty-eight states and the Federal Government. Today, the
Federal Government of the United States exercised an authority
undreamed of when the Constitution was formed, and the people
of the United States were grateful for the simple conceptions con-
tained in their Constitution. In like manner, Mr. Dulles foresaw
that if the Charter contained simple and broad principles future
generations would be thankful to the men at San Francisco who had
drafted it."
When Mr. DulIes had concluded, "the Chairman moved a vote of
thanks" for "his masterly exposition" and "Mr. Evatt rose to second
this motion." Clearly "domestic jurisdiction" still awaits content
from the realities of the contemporary world power process.
Equally unenlightening for rational policy decision by the United
States or others is the doctrinal half-truth, paraded by the bar leaders,
that traditional international law concerns itself only with states and
not with individuals. Even if it were a fact that traditional doctrines
designed to regulate relations between nation-states in "an unscientific
age of subsidized piracy, matchlocks, wood fires and candlelight,
wide-open spaces, and glorification of cruel aggressive force for selfish
profit" 131 were not designed and did little to protect the individual
human being, that fact would be of little relevance to the task of
defining doctrine and creating institutions appropriate for protecting
the individual human being in this atomic era. It is not questioned of
course that in recent centuries nation-states have been the principal
participants in the world power process and that by reason of habitual
anthropomorphic reification such states have been made the principal
addressees of the doctrines of international law. The fact is, however,
- despite all the hair-splitting about the "subjects" and "objects" of
international law, the ultimate beneficiary of its doctrines has always
been the individual. In eloquent castigation of the reiterated view
that international law "is a law between states" under which "in-
dividuals have no rights and no personality," Professor Frederick
Dunn states: 132 "In my view, this particular legal fossil is highly mis-
leading and in large degree false, and its continued hold on the minds of
many people explains in part why international law is held in such ill
repute by laymen today." Referring to the common rule that inter-
national law is part of the law of the land, Lauterpacht praises the
131. Borrowed from Bingham, The Continental Shelf and the Marginal Belt, 40 Am.
J. INT'L L. 173, 178 (1946).
132. Dunn, The International Rights of Individuals, PRoc. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 14
(1941). Cf. Brown, World Law, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 159 (1946); FENWxCx, INTEm-
NATIONAL LAW 134 (3d ed. 1948).
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rule as "a beneficent doctrine inasmuch as it brings into prominence
the fact that the obligations of international law are, in the last resort,
addressed to individual human beings." "I Often quoted is the wis-
dom of Westlake: "the duties and rights of states are only the duties
and rights of the men who compose them." 134 Emphasis upon the
theoretical relation of "states" to the exclusion of individuals is in
fact of relatively recent origin, a product of nineteenth century pos-
itivism.'3 5 The law of nations of previous centuries with its roots in
natural law, both Christian 136 and Greek, and in the jus genlium of the
Roman world, gave a primary place to the individual, the very essence
of natural law being that sense of moral justice, of "right reason,"
which has no meaning except in terms of a heightened awareness of the
worth of human personality. 13 Even the most casual glance at the
works of Grotius and Pufendorf-or even Vattel-demonstrates the
tremendous impact of this idea. Clearly it was a principal considera-
tion in the efforts of Grotius, the accepted father of international law, to
restore order to the troubled world of the seventeenth century. It is
indeed only from the narrowest perspectives of international law as
conceived in the period since Bentham that an observer can claim
that even theoretically only states, exclusive of individuals, are the
subjects of international law. Apart from theoretical considerations,
nineteenth century international law, oriented as it was to utilitarian-
ism and laissez-faire, has in fact promoted the interests of individuals
rather than bare relations between sovereign states. This is the import
of rules regarding the diplomatic protection of citizens abroad, of the
laws of war and of neutrality, and of many of the doctrines about juris-
diction."' One has, furthermore, only to look at the content of treaty-
law to gain true perspective as to the preponderance of concern for the
activities of men over the inter-relations of states.1 Treaty-law re-
veals also the beginning of a trend toward an increased role for the
individual in the procedural aspects of international law. Witness the
granting of the right of individual access to international tribunals,
such as the Central American Court of Justice, or the Arbitral Tri-
bunals set up after the first World War.140 In more recent years the
133. OPPaiHEim, op. cit. .rpra note 117, at 21,41.
134. WEsTLAx_, CorLucra PAPERs oN Punic InINATNAL Lw 78 (1914).
135. Idelson, The Law of Nations and the Individual, 30 Tn. or THE Gnonus SocrEr"
50 (1944).
136. For an enlargement of this orientation of human rights, see MAMTAIN, TIM
RIGHTS oF MAN mm NArTuRA. LAW (1943).
137. Idelson, sipra note 135, at 51; Report of Lord Porter'es Commitlee on "Interna-
tional Law and the Rights of the Individual," 31 Tn. oF THE Gnonrus Socznry 9D (1946).
138. Dunn, supra note 132, at 15.
139. It may be emphasized that all agreements which become the law of the land have
very direct effects on the citizens of a state.
140. Hambro, Individuals before International Tribunals, Pnoc. Am. Soc'Y INT'L 28
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myth that nation-states are the sole subjects of international law has
received other fatal blows from the demands of a whole host of or-
ganizations-such as the United Nations itself, the Bank, the Fund,
and UNRRA-for "personality" and all of its attendant rights and
privileges in international doctrine and practice.' 4 ' It is coming more
and more to be recognized that nation-states, as important as they
are, are not the sole participants in the world power process, and that
the most critical challenge of our time is the task of devising a world
law appropriate for all the new participants, such as international
governmental organizations, transnational political parties, trans-
national private associations (cartels), and even the humble individual
human being. 1
4 2
Similarly without enlightenment and relevance to wise policy de-
cision about the human rights agreements is that other, complementary
half-truth, invoked by the bar leaders, that by traditional international
law there can be no interference from any source in the relations be-
tween a nation-state and its citizens. Even if it be assumed that by
customary international doctrine nation-states have been left largely
free to treat their own citizens as they will, the conclusion that such
states cannot agree, or that it is unwise for them to agree, to do other-
wise is a transparent and arrogant non-sequitur. As the American Bar
Association's thoroughly considered monograph, The International Law
of the Future, recites with documentation: "Instances are numerous in
which states have assumed international obligations with respect to
the treatment of their own nationals." "1 Wholly apart from agree-
ment, states have long assumed a prerogative of humanitarian in-
tervention "when a State renders itself guilty of cruelties against and
persecution of its Nationals, in such a way as to deny their fundamental
human rights and to shock the conscience of mankind." 144 Drawing
(1941); JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 18-19 (1948); Idelson, szapra note 135, at
60; Aufricht, Personality in International Law, 37 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 217 (1943).
141. See International Court of Justice, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service
of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE REroars 174
(1949) ; Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, oral state-
ments by Kerno and Feller, United Nations (1949). Jenks, The Legal Personallty of
International Organications, 22 Bur. Y. B. INT'L L. 11 (1945) ; see also Idelson, supra note
135, at 59 and citations therein.
142. This is a principal theme of JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS (1948), generally
recognized as the most profound of contemporary books on its subject.
143. AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TiiE FUTURE
36 (1944). A foreword indicates that the monograph is a product of some thirty regional
conferences, inspired and led by Judge Hudson. Cf. JESSUP, op. cit. supra note 142, at 88.
144. OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 117, at 280. Cf. 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAWN 249,
209 (2d ed. 1945) offering (at p. 211) prophetic understatement: "It is to be expected
that international society will ultimately evince an interest in the welfare of the private
individual sufficien to cause the law of nations to restrict the freedom of a State in its
treatment of its nationals."
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upon a variety of precedents, such as "long prescribed standards for
a State's protection of aliens within its territory," and insisting that
"nationals too should have the benefit of the standard which the
dictates of humanity and justice impose," the American BarAssociation
monograph, mentioned above, generalizes in Principle 2: "Each State
has a legal duty to see that conditions prevailing within its own terri-
tory do not menace international peace and order, and to this end it
must treat its own population in a way which will not violate the
dictates of humanity and justice or shock the conscience of man-
kind." 145 Comment explains that this "Principle would require of
each State a minimum protection" of "all inhabitants of its terri-
tory." 146 A very recent precedent of world-wide renown and of
potentially tremendous influence may be found in the Nuremberg
Charter and Judgment. 47 Though principally acclaimed for its im-
position of duties upon the individual irrespective of nation-state law,
the Nuremberg precedent makes positive contribution to the inter-
national protection of human rights. Along with crimes against peace
and war crimes, Article 6 of the Charter lists crimes against humanity:
"Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war, or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated." Though limited by the judgment of the
Tribunal to "inhumane acts, in connection with the planning or waging
of aggressive war," 148 this concept of crimes against humanity is
capable of future generalization. The significance of the predecent is
best stated by Professor Lauterpacht:
"Crimes against humanity are crimes regardless of whether they
were committed in accordance with and in obedience to the na-
tional law of the accused. Such acts were deemed to violate the
sanctity of human personality to such a degree as to make irrel-
evant reliance upon the law of the State which ordered them. To
lay down that crimes against humanity are punishable is, there-
fore, to assert the existence of rights of man grounded in a la.,
145. Supra note 143, at 35-37.
146. Id. at 36.
147. An excellent brief summary appears in IrEmRxATio.;AL LAW Commission, UaTrEm
NATioNs, THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF THE NORNBERG TRmu.NAL (1949).
Other contemporary rejections of the "act of state" doctrine also demonstrate that the
relation between a state and its own citizens is not the sacrosanct citadel that some my-
thology suggests, Comment, 57 YALE L. J. 108 (1947). Note especially the acts of allied
military government in setting aside Nazi expropriations. If it is possible to act after the
fact to make amends, how much more rational to act before the event to prevent inhumani-
ties from occurring.
148. INTERNATIO-NAL LAW CommissIoN, op. cit. supra note 147, at 68.
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superior to the law of the State. Thus, upon analysis, the enact-
ment of crimes against humanity in an international instrument
signifies the acknowledgment of fundamental rights of the in-
dividual recognised by international law." "'
The power of agreement to vary customary doctrine and impose
special obligations upon states in the treatment of their own citizens
has, as the Bar Association monograph suggests, been many times
demonstrated. Among the better known examples are the "minorities
treaties" after World War I for the protection of racial, linguisitic, and
religious groups, and the more general provisions in the peace treaties
concluded since World War II.150 Mention might also be made of "an
imposing array" '" of agreements for repressing slavery and the slave
trade, for promoting humane conditions of labor, for preventing white-
slavery, for policing opium trade, for protecting aborigines, for safe-
guarding health, and so on.152 The agreement we should like most to
emphasize is, however, the United Nations Charter itself. It is simple
anachronism to suggest that the proposed Human Rights Covenant and
the Genocide Convention embody revolutionary innovation. Whatever
innovation there is, the decisive break with all past unconcern of cus-
tomary international law for human rights, the generalization of all the
many precedents indicated above into a principle of positive concern,
came with adoption of the Charter four years ago. "It is already law,"
writes Ambassador Jessup in contrast to Mr. Rix, "at least for Members
of the United Nations, that respect for human dignity and fundamental
human right is obligatory. The duty is imposed by the Charter, a
149. Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 64 L. Q. REv. 97, 104 (1948).
See also UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
WAR CRIMES COMMISSION 174, 192 (1948) ; Brand, Crimes Against Humanity and the
Nuremberg Trials, 28 ORE. L. REv. 93 (1949) ; Lowenthal, Harris, Woolsey, and Farr,
The Nuremberg Verdict, 60 HARv. L. REv. 857, 884 (1947).
150. For discussion of these examples see articles by Mary G. Jones and Stephen
Kertesz, Symposium on International Human Rights, Summer and Autumn issues (1949)
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS.
151. Borrowed from OPPENHEIm, op. cit. spra note 117, at 584.
152. WRIGHT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD ORDER 15 (Commission to Study the Or-
ganization of Peace, 1942).
For international control of atomic energy the United States has proposed a system of
inspection which would invade the relations between a state and its citizens, and few ob-
servers outside the Soviet Union doubt that such a measure is necessary to adequate en-
forcement of security. See SHILS, THE ATOMIC BomB IN WORLD POLITICS (1948);
INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY, GROWTH OF A POLICY (U. S. Dep't State,
1946) ; and POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS (1948).
The important point is not whether a proposed agreement interferes in the relations
between a state and its citizens, but whether the objectives of the parties, considering the
whole context in which they find themselves, require such interference. If it is necessary
to the adequate protection of human rights and to security to require states to assume obli-
gations with respect to their own citizens, such action is no less rational and no more con-
trary to international law than the proposed inspection system for atomic energy.
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treaty to which they are parties." 153 Similarly, Professor Lauterpacht
insists that the human rights provisions of the Charter are not "mere
embellishment of an historic document" 154 but rather constitute
binding legal obligation, recognizing "fundamental rights of the in-
dividual independent of the law of his state." "The Charter of the
United Nations is," he writes, "a legal document; its language is the
153. JEssup, op. cit. mpra note 142, at 26, 91.
For clarity of thinking it is necessary to observe a distinction between binding obligation
as between nations under international law and the internal or domestic effects of an agree-
ment as a "part of the law of the land." To establish binding international obligation it
is not necessary to establish that the terms of the United Nations Charter are sufficiently
precise and "self-executing" to become the law of the land, without further legislative
implementation. What agreements, in the absence of a clear expression of intent, are or
are not "self-executing" under our law is still a matter of speculation and controversy.
Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing, 20 Ams.J. INT'L L. 444 (1926) ; Henry,
When Is a Treaty Self-Executing, 27 MIcH. L. REv. 776 (1929). It may be observed,
however, that a promise to pronmte respect for and observance of human rights and free-
dom is not, under common sense interpretation, compatible with insistence upon the main-
tenance of internal doctrines and practices destructive of human rights and freedom and
violent opposition to all change. The declarations of the framers of the Charter at San
Francisco are, moreover, instructive. On the necessity for including the maintenance of
human rights under the Charter, the official record states:
"There was considerable discussion... of this point, with emphasis on the idea that
respect for human rights should also be mentioned in Chapter II ["Principles," now
Chapter I] as a principle to be observed by all members. It was felt that if this statement
were included only in Chapter I ["Purposes," now Chapter I], it would bind only the
Organization and would relieve member governments from the obligation to respect the
fundanental freedoms of individuals within their own countries."
Committee I/l, 6 DocumENs OF THE UNITED NATION.S CON-FEENCE ON IN,,TMA-
ToIAr. ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCISCO, 1945, 291 (1945). (Italics supplied.)
Four Justices of the Supreme Court have, further, indicated a sense of obligation to take
into account the policy embodied in the United Nations Charter in decisions about human
rights. Justice Black, with whom Justice Douglas agreed, concurred in the California
Alien Land Law case, Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (1948), declaring that one of
the reasons why the law is bad is that "we have recently pledged ourselves to cooperate
with the United Nations to 'promote . . .universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion' [citing the Charter, Articles 55c and 56]. How can this nation be faithful to this
international pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and occupancy by aliens on
account of race are permitted to be enforced?" Id. at 649-650. And in the concurring
opinion of Justice Murphy, who was joined by Justice Rutledge: "The Alien Land Law
stands as a barrier to the fulfillment of that national pledge. Its inconsistency with the
Charter, which has been duly ratified and adopted by the United States, is but one more
reason why the statute must be condemned." Id. at 673. For further confirmation of
this interpretation, see Namba v. McCourt, 204 P.2d 569, 579 (Ore. 1949).
Compare the companion Canadian case, In re Drummond Wren, 4 D.L.R. 674 (1945).
For telling argument that the United Nations obligations are already "the law of the
land," see Sayre, Shelley v. Kraemer and United Nations Law, 34 IowA L Rav. 1 (1948),
and United Nations Law, 25 CAN. B. R-v. 809 (1947).
154. See Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCITio, Raor oF THE
FoRTY-SECoN CONFERENCE, PRAGUE, 1947, 13, 14-15 (1948).
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language of law, of international law. In affirming repeatedly the
'fundamental human rights' of the individual, it must of necessity
be deemed to refer to legal rights-to legal rights recognized by in-
ternational law and independent of the law of the State." "I It is,
therefore, the task and opportunity of the proposed new agreements,
not to innovate in principle, but to translate obligation already as-
sumed into concrete detail in the practice of states.
Though irrelevant to establishing the unimpaired power of nation-
states to make new agreements about human rights, the practice of the
various organs of the United Nations under the Charter during the
past four years is relevant as evidence of the common consensus of
mankind that all peoples everywhere are interdependent as to human
rights and security.'5 Contrary to the broad interpretation favored
by the bar leaders, Article 2(7) has proved little impediment to the
competence of United Nations organs to take action in a number of
situations which might from isolationist perspectives be regarded as
involving "essentially" domestic questions. 5 ' Thus, in the Spanish
case in 1946 both the Security Council and the General Assembly took
jurisdiction of questions about the nature of the Spanish government.
In the view of the majority of the Council the Franco regime was re-
garded as likely to endanger international peace and security within
the meaning of Article 34, a fact that called for action by the Council
under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes).' In reply to the
objection that Article 2, paragraph 7, prohibited such action Dr. Evatt
(an enthusiastic supporter of a broad scope for Article 2(7) at San
Francisco) ' explained:
"Then, I return to the object of the action in order to demon-
strate that this matter is not essentially one of domestic concern.
155. Lauterpacht, supra note 149, at 101, 102.
156. Further evidence of the concern of the peoples of the world for human rights may
be found in the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, just completed by the
International Law Commission of the United Nations for submission to the General As-
sembly. Article 6 of this draft reads, "Every state has the duty to treat all persons under
its jurisdiction with respect for human ,rights and fundamental freedoms, without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."
Mr. Koretsky (Soviet Union) and Judge Hudson (United States) voted against the
draft declaration. According to Sohn, The Development of International Law, 35
A.B.A.J. 688, 689 (1949) : "Judge Hudson stated that he voted against the Draft Declara-
tion because the provisions of its Article 6 went beyond the Charter of the United Nations
and beyond international law at its present stage of development." It may be noted that
Judge Hudson stood alone on this point and be re-emphasized that, whatever existing
doctrine, there is no doctrine to preclude states from making new agreements,
157. See FINCHAM, op. cit. vtpra note 115, at 103-140 for a convenient summary.
158. Id. at 108-113; GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, op. cit. supra note 115, at 115.
159. See 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL OR-
GANIZATION, SAN FRANcIsco, 1945, 436 et seq. (1945). Dr. Evatt is responsible for the
present limitation of the exception within Article 2, paragraph 7, namely, that author-
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The object is to remove a danger to international peace and a cause
of international friction.... The argument, therefore, that the
United Nations and the Security Council or any other Members
of the United Nations, cannot touch this matter, because it merely
affects internal affairs in Spain is unsubstantial and should be
rejected." 160
And again:
"If the facts indicate that that regime, by its nature, by its con-
duct, by its operation is likely to interfere with international peace
and likely to be a menace to its neighbors, then the existence of
that regime is no longer a matter of essentially domestic jurisdic-
tion." 161
The General Assembly on its part was even more emphatic. In support
of a resolution adopted barring Spain from membership in the United
Nations and recommending withdrawal of ambassadors, M. Alfaro of
Panama stated:
"But the dogma of non-intervention has nothing to do with the
great system of collective action that we set up by the Charter at
San Francisco. Arbitrary intervention infringes upon the princi-
ples of independence. Collective action is based on the doctrine
of interdependence. Collective action is foreseen, authorized, and
agreed upon in specific provisions of the Charter, and it is indis-
pensable for the United Nations to exert, because without collec-
tive action we cannot have peace and security, we cannot promote
human rights, we cannot have disarmament, we cannot make the
trusteeship regime work, we cannot have international co-opera-
tion, we cannot accomplish any of the great, vital, basic principles,
for which we have organized the world community of States ...
"To invoke Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter against this
resolution is to miss the point entirely. We are not dealing here
with any matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
Spain. We are making recommendations that concern only the
individual sovereignty of the Members of the United Nations, be-
cause each nation is absolutely free to maintain or not to maintain
ambassadors or ministers in any given country. I will conclude by
stating that situations that are an actual or potential danger to the
peace of the world, and constitute a continuous, notorious, grave
and shocking violation of the most elementary human rights, are
ization of intervention by the organization in cases arising under Chapter VII (Action with
Respect to threats to the Peace, breaches of the Peace, and acts of Aggression)-see the
final phrase of Art. 2(7)-is limited to cases where enforcement measures under that
Chapter are required.
160. Journal of the Security Council No. 37 at 278, 279 (1947) ; quoted in Fxcnr.&,
op. cit. supra note 115, at 110-111.
161. Id., No. 39, at 767, quoted in FincHAr, op. cit. supra note 115, at 113-114. No res-
olution was adopted, however, despite approval by the Council, because the permanent
members could not agree on a te.-t. GooDRIcH AND HMaRo, op. cit. mipra note 115, at 115.
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not matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any par-
ticular State; they are essentially within international jurisdiction,
essentially within the powers and duties of the United Nations." 162
Likewise in the South African case the General Assembly assumed its
competence and took jurisdiction, despite the objection that alleged
discriminatory treatment of Indian immigrants by the Union of South
Africa, in respect to suffrage and land tenure, was a matter essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of that country." 3 When both the
form of government of a state and internal discriminations are re-
garded as of "international concern" rather than of "domestic juris-
diction," it needs no emphasis that "domestic jurisdiction" is a concept
of dwindling proportions. Further illustration could be offered by
reference to the Greek and Indonesian cases. 164 Whatever the actual
facts of world-wide interdependence, is it clear that the representatives
of the peoples assembled in the United Nations regard the human
rights and security of all peoples as indivisible. It is difficult to believe
that so many observers, from such different vantage points around the
world and representing such diverse cultures, can all be wrong.
V
The second major charge of the bar leaders that United States'
participation in the United Nations program is unconstitutional as
beyond the scope of the treaty or other federal power is equally with-
out merit. Both Supreme Court opinion and the opinion of leading
publicists make it clear, on the contrary, that our participation is well
within the scope of the treaty and other federal power.
Undefined in the Constitution itself, the treaty power has always
been regarded as sufficiently broad and expansible to cover all matters
of genuine international concern, under whatever conditions a chang-
ing world context may impose. No treaty has ever been held uncon-
stitutional, 16 5 and it is the general consensus that outside of certain
wide limitations there is no subject about which a treaty may not be
made. 66 The prevailing interpretation of the several relevant clauses
162. Journal of the United Nations, No. 60, Supplement A-A/Pv/59, at 556 (1946);
quoted in FINCHAM, op. cit. supra note 115, at 138.
163. See FINCHAM, op. cit. supra note 115, at 117-135; Gross, Impact of the United
Nations Upon Domestic Jurisdiction, 18 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 259, 263-264 (1948).
164. See FiNCHAM, op. cit. supra note 115, at 104-107, 114-117; Gross, supra note 163,
at 262.
165. See DEVLiN, THE TREATY POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 128 § 133 (1908).
166. See Feidler and Dwan, The Extent of the Treaty-Making Power, 28 GEo. L. J.
184 (1939) ; Burr, Treaty-Making Power, 51 PRoc. Am. PHIL. Soc'Y 271 (1912) ; Butler,
Limitations of the Treaty-Making Power of the United States in Matters Comitg Within
the Jurisdiction of the States, 23 Pnoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 176 (1929) ; Hughes, id. at
194; Boyd, The Expanding Treaty-Power, 6 N.C.L. REv. 428 (1928); Lenoir, Treaties
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of the Constitution 167 was most clearly expounded by the Supreme
Court in a famous passage in Geofroy v. Riggs in 1890: 10G
"The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms
unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that in-
strument against the action of the government or of its depart-
ments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself
and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends
so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in
the character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a
cession of any portion of the territory of the latter without its
consent. .. .But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that
there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching
any matter which is properly the subject of negotiations with a
foreign country." 169
It is immediately apparent that the limitations as to agreements which
seek basically to change the Constitution or "authorize what the Con-
stitution forbids" are not relevant to the present question. Only the
grossest distortion of perspectives could envisage the human rights
and the Supreme Court, 1 U. oF CHL L. REv. 602 (1934); Kuhn, The Treaty-Making
Power and the Reserved Sovereignty of the States, 7 COL L. RI.. 172 (1907) ; Magnusson,
Our Membership in the United Nations and the Federal Treaty-Power Under the Con-
stitution, 34 VA. L. REv. 137 (1948); Hudson, The Treaty-Maing Power of the United
States in Connection with the Manufacture of Arms and Ammunition, 28 Am. J. I..eL L
736 (1934) ; CoRwI THE CoxsrrruTON AND WORLD ORGANIZATION (1944); NAn0oAL
SupmcY (1913) ; TOTAL WVAR AND THE CoNsITUTIoN, c. 4 (1947) ; 1 Wn.LouGunY, Tn
CoNsTrruTioxAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 215 (1910); 2 STo t, CounmunT ES on
THE CoNsT IrUTiOx OF THE Uxrian STATES § 1508 (3rd ed. 1858); Vsm t, L.ot
TREaTs Ax LABOR ComuAcrs (1937); 2 BuTLE:R, TREATY-MAXI NG Pova oF
THE UNITED STATES (1902); Z HYDE, IxTENA.TIoxAL LA , CHIEFLY AS INTEMrTM
AND APPLED By THE UITED STATES 1391 (2d rev. ed. 1945).
Legislation enacted pursuant to the treaty-power and co-extensive with it is covered
by the same rule. Where a treaty is validly made "there can be no question whether the
subsequent legislation to carry out the treaty is constitutional." Feidler and Divan, . upra
note 166, at 197; see Anderson, Extent and Linitations of the Treaty Power under the
Constitution, 1 A. J. IxfL L. 636, 657 (1907) ; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 432
(1920) ; Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109 (1901).
167. The important grants of power are of course Art. II, Sec. 2, Par. 2, which reads:
"He [the President] shall have the power, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur..
and Art. VI, Par. 2, which reads:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursu-
ance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the
United States, shall be the Supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not-
withstanding'
168. 133 U. S. 258 (1890) (Treaty of 1853 with France permitting aliens to inherit
property, held superior to contrary law of Maryland, which was applicable in the District
of Columbia where case arose).
169. Id. at 267.
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program as interfering, for example, with a republican form of govern-
ment 170 or seeking to establish a religion. The only relevant limitation
(beyond the safeguards of the Fifth Amendment, to be discussed below)
is that which limits the subject matter of a treaty to questions "that
properly pertain to our foreign relations." "I Chief Justice Hughes
expressed this point succinctly:
"It seems to me that, whatever doubt there may originally have
been or may yet linger in some minds in regard to the scope of the
treaty-making power, so far as it relates to the external concerns of
the nation there is no question for discussion. I think it perfectly idle
to consider that the Supreme Court would ever hold that any
treaty made in a constitutional manner in relation to external con-
cerns of the nation is beyond the power of the sovereignty of the
United States or invalid under the Constitution of the United
States where no express prohibition of the Constitution has been
violated." 172
The still leading case on the scope of the treaty power is Missouri v.
Holland,7 3 holding that the treaty power may be extended even be-
yond the limits of the powers expressly delegated to the Congress,
when those powers are too narrowly construed to permit effective
action on matters of national interest and international concern.
The decision in this case sustained an act of Congress, adopted under
the "necessary and proper" clause, to implement a treaty made with
Great Britain for the protection of migratory birds traveling between
the United States and Canada. Two lower courts had held uncon-
stitutional an earlier act of Congress, not in aid of a treaty but designed
to secure the same end.17 4 Speaking for the Court, Justice Holmes said:
"Whether the two cases cited were decided rightly or not they
cannot be accepted as a test of the treaty power. Acts of Congress
are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the
Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under
170. Butler, Limitations of the Treaty-Making Power of the United Slates inl Matters
Coming Within the Jurisdiction of the States, 23 PRoc. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 176, 178 (1929).
171. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U. S. 30, 40 (1931). Cf. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S.
33Z, 341 (1924) ; Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211,243 (U. S. 1872).
172. Hughes, supra note 166, at 194. (Italics supplied.) For other authorities adher-
ing to the same view see: CoRwxr, NATIONAL SUPREMACY (1913); Burr, supra note
166, at 285. Judge Hudson states:
"... it is essential that within very wide limits the Government of the United States
should have power to do by treaty what is thought to be for the interests of the United
States, and no construction of the Constitution which would deprive it of such power is
to be tolerated."
Hudson, supra, note 166, at 738.
173. 252 U. S. 416 (1920).
174. See United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288 (D. Kan. 1915); United States
v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154 (E. D. Ark. 1914).
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the authority of the United States. It is open to question whether
the authority of the United States means more than the formal
acts prescribed to make the convention. We do not mean to imply
that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power; but
they must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that
there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national
well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a
treaty followed by such an act could, and it is not lightly to be
assumed that, in matters requiring national action, 'a power
which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized gov-
ernment' is not to be found. . . . [WVihen we are dealing with
words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the
United States, we must realize that they have called into life a
being the development of which could not have been foreseen com-
pletely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them
to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken
a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to
prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be con-
sidered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in
that of what was said a hundred years ago. The treaty in question
does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the
Constitution. The only question is whether it is forbidden by
some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth
Amendment. We must consider what this country has become in
deciding what that Amendment has reserved. . . .No doubt
the great body of private relations usually fall within the control
of the State, but a treaty may override its power. . . .Here a
national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved.
It can be protected only by national action in concert with that
of another power." 15
What is of "external" or "international" concern, it may be added,
need not be exclusively so. In many instances, if not in most, there is
a concurrence of interest which has both domestic and foreign ap-
plication. Local matters can, as in the Holland case they did, become
as Hughes suggests "so related to international matters that an in-
ternational regulation could not appropriately succeed without em-
bracing local affairs as well." 17
It may reasonably be assumed that what are matters of international
concern for determining the scope of the treaty power is in the last
analysis a question, not of derivation from authoritative doctrine, but
of fact and of contemporary fact. The concern of the peoples of the
world for human rights and the international character of such rights
for the purposes of international law have already been sufficiently
demonstrated. Nothing in the context of the creation of our Consti-
tution or in the subsequent history of our constitutional development
175. 252 U. S. 416, 433-434, 435 (1920).
176. Hughes, spra note 166, at 195; see also Feidler and Dwan, supra note 166, at 195.
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offers any barrier to the conclusion that human rights are equally of
international concern for exercise of the treaty power. The constitu-
tional framers plainly foresaw the possibilities of unanticipated de-
velopment in the scope of the treaty power, as Madison's reluctance
to specify its content shows:
"The object of treaties is the regulation of intercourse with foreign
nations and is external. I do not think it possible to enumerate all
the cases in which such external regulations would be necessary.
Would it be right to define all the cases in which Congress could
exercise this authority? The definition might and probably would
be defective. They might be restrained by such a definition from
exercising the authority where it could be essential to the interest
and safety of the community. It is most safe, therefore, to leave it to
be exercised as contingencies may arise." 177
It is both certain that the framers could not have foreseen as the sub-
ject of treaties such items as patents, copyrights, health, drugs, labor
relations, commercial aviation, armaments, and a host of matters
which have become questions of international concern since 1787,111
and equally clear from Madison's remarks that they did not see
"external" matters as a fixed and unalterable category. And if this
category was not intended to be fixed, and has not proved to be so in
practice, "then it is obvious" as one authority points out "that the
limits of the [treaty] power are coeval and coterminous with the
increasing and expanding nature of the relations between nations." "I
In the face of world problems and interdependences involving every
aspect of human activity to a degree unimagined even a few years ago,
it seems unreal and foolish-even dangerous-to rest any question of
fact or policy on a view which holds that the migration of birds can be
a matter of international concern, but that the liberty and welfare of
human beings cannot.
It is now generally agreed, as indicated by Justice Holmes in Missouri
v. Holland,"'0 that the scope of the treaty power is in no way limited by
the powers otherwise reserved by the Constitution to the states or by
any "invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amend-
ment." "I' On no point have the Supreme Court and leading author-
ities been more emphatic. "The powers of the states . . . set no limit
to the treaty-making power." 182 The celebrated case of Ware v. IHyl-
177. 3 ELLIOTT'S DEnATEs 514 (2d ed. 1836-1866) (italics supplied); see DEVLIN,
op. cit. supra note 165, at 128.
178. See WEINFI.D, op. cit. supra note 166, at 25; also Comment, Treaties and the
Constitution: Alien Property Rights, 37 COL. L. REV. 1361 (1937).
179. Boyd, supra note 166 at 441.
180. 252 U. S. 416 (1920) ; see note 173 supra.
181. Id. at 434.
182. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 101 (10th cd. 1948).
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ton,'83 which held the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain in 1783
paramount to a Virginia statute discharging debts due British sub-
jects, speaks with unusual authority since one of the justices had been
a member of the Federal Convention and another of a State Conven-
tion adopting the Federal Constitution.184 Speaking for the Court
Justice Chase laid down the rule which with only inconsequential
deviation 185 has continued to the present day:
"It seems to me that treaties made by congress according to the con-
federation, were superior to the laws of the States; because the con-
federation made them obligatory on all the States ....
"[But] if doubts could exist before the establishment of the
present national government, they must be entirely removed by
the sixth article of the constitution which provides 'that all treaties
made or which shall be made under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land.. . .' It is the de-
clared will of the people of the United States that every treaty
made by the authority of the United States shall be superior to
the constitution and laws of any individual state; and their will
alone is to decide." iSS
The subjects covered in application of this principle have repeatedly
extended to matters ordinarily left to regulation by the states. In
addition to abrogation of debts in the case just mentioned these in-
clude: title to land,' escheat and inheritance,iSS statute of limita-
tions, 18 9 local taxation,' administration of alien estates,"' prohibition
183. 3 Dall. 199 (U. S. 1796). Cf. Clerke v. Harwood, 3 Dall. 343 (U. S. 1797).
184. These were Justice Wilson and Justice Iredell. See Butler, sipra, note 170, at 179.
185. Arising from concern for slave-holding interests, the doctrine that the scope of
the treaty-power could not extend to matters reserved to the states, was put forward as
dicta by Chief Justice Taney in Provost v. Greneaux, 19 How. 1 (U. S. 1856) (treaty
with France held not intended to supersede Louisiana state succession tax law). See
CoRwn, THE CoNsruox AxD WoRLD ORGANIZATION 13-14 (1944); 1 Wn.wucu;,
op. cit. supra note 166, secs. 213-15.
186. 3 DalI. 199, 236,237 (U. S. 1796).
187. Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603 (U. S. 1813) (involving title
under Virginia law as opposed to Treaty of 1794 with Great Britain). Cf. Hughes v. Ed-
wards, 9 Wheat 489, 496 (U. S. 1824) (Kentucky statute barring alien land holding) ;
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 'Wheat. 464 (U. S. 1823).
See, for these and cases cited in notes 188-193 infra, Feidler and Dwan, Supra note 166;
WEINFELD, LABOR TREATIES AND LABOR ComPACTS 14 et seq. (1937) ; Kulm, supra note 166.
188. Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259 (U. S. 1S17) (Maryland escheat law abrogated by
treaty with France) ; Hauenstein v. Lynhan, 100 U. S. 483 (1879) (common law and
statutory law of Virginia overruled by Swiss Treaty of 1850); Santovinceazo v. Egan,
284 U. S. 30 (1931) (treaty with Persia and New York escheat law).
189. Hopdrk v. Bell, 3 Cranch 454 (U. S. 1806) (Virginia statute of limitations).
190. Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U. S. 47 (1929) (1826 Treaty with Denmark superior to
Iowa tax law).
191. These are the consular cases. See, e.g., Matter of Fattosini, 33 Misc. 18, 67 N. Y.
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against employment of foreign labor, 92 and the limitation of pawn-
brokerage to citizens.' 9 ' Nor is the predilection for national supremacy
confined to federal courts. State courts also have presented and re-
jected the states-rights argument.'94 The contention that most of
these subjects have involved aliens and thus form a particular category
of state-supervised activity has little merit in the face of Missouri v.
Holland,9 5 which made applicable to American citizens regulations
respecting the preservation of birds. And there is no need to suppose
the end of this development has been reached. Many years ago Pro-
fessor Borchard observed:
"It is within the power of the federal government by treaty to
remove from state control any matter which may become the sub-
ject of negotiation with a foreign government. With the continued
drawing together of the world by increased facilities for travel and
communication, the subjects of common interest which require
international regulation will continue to grow in extent and variety.
Uniformity of legislation by withdrawal from state legislative con-
trol of such subjects as marriage and divorce, labor legislation, the
ownership and inheritance of property, and all matters affecting
aliens would be possible by the exertion of the necessary federal
treaty power." "I
Only the narrowest perspective could except the human rights pro-
gram from the scope of power otherwise so broadly conceived.
Coming explicitly to the Tenth Amendment, it is clear that this
famous constitutional truism imposes no limit on the treaty power.
Nowhere in the constitutional debates, either federal or state, is there
any indication that such limitation was contemplated. As Burr points
out:
"The very language of the amendment would seem to establish
this fact. What are the powers reserved to the States thereby?
'The powers' first, says the amendment, 'not delegated to the
Supp. 1119 (Surr. Ct. 1900) ; Matter of Lobrasciano, 38 Misc. 415, 77 N. Y. Supp, 1040
(Surr. Ct. 1902) ; McEvoy v. Wyman, 191 Mass. 276, 77 N. E. 379 (1906). See Iuhn,
supra note 166, at 180. For a more recent discussion of the cases see Comment, Treaties
and the Constitution: Alien Property Rights, 37 COL. L. REV. 1361 (1937). Cf. Rocca v.
Thompson, 223 U. S. 317, 330-331 (1912), holding that although it was within the power
of the national government to confer the exclusive right of administration of alien intestate
estates on consuls, the words of a particular treaty might not require the contravention
of state law. See Comment, supra, at 1367-1368.
192. Baker v. Portland, 2 Fed. Cas. 472, No. 777 (C.C.D. Ore. 1879).
193. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332 (1924) (involving treaty of 1911 with Japan).
194. Especially Opel v. Shoup, 100 Iowa 407, 420 (1896) ; see Kuhn, supra note 166,
at 180, n.1.
195. 252 U. S. 416 (1920).
196. Comment, Treaty-Making Power as Support for Federal Legislation, 29 YALE L.J.
445, 449 (1920).
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United States,' and second, adds the amendment, not 'prohibited
by it" [the Constitution] to the States. Now, by the Constitution
the power to make treaties is specifically granted to the Federal
government in the Second Section of the Second Article, and
specifically prohibited to the States by the Tenth Section of the
First Article. . . . The reserved rights of the States are necessarily
and by virtue of the very words of the Tenth Amendment, those
rights which remain after the grant, first, of the treaty-making
power, and second, of the power of Congress to legislate upon
certain subjects. The Tenth Amendment, therefore, leaves the
treaty-making power of the United States unaltered and precisely
as granted by the Constitution." 97
The cases, already referred to, holding treaties superior to state law
confirm this position. If, as has been held, the Tenth Amendment is
merely "declaratory" and of no effect as a bar to broad congressional
powers under the commerce clause,19s it has even less cause to be
revived in order to cut down the treaty power. The conclusion is thus
inevitable: the Amendment is wholly immaterial, both as to the pro-
visions of treaties themselves and to the legislation supplementing
them.
199
The wisdom of the conclusion that state power does not restrict
treaty power is demonstrated by a glance at the alternative. "Were
it true," it is suggested, "that the United States could not enter into
treaties affecting matters understood to be generally reserved to the
States . . . the result would be an intolerable restriction upon the
power of a sovereign nation." 210 The United States would not in fact
be sovereign in the sense of having real power to protect itself in world
affairs, a point which Justice Holmes emphasized in Missouri v. Holland
in urging that "it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters re-
quiring national action, 'a power which must belong to and somewhere
reside in every civilized government' is not to be found." 211
197. Burr, supra note 166, at 362-363.
198. Spealdng for the Court in United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1940),
which overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918), Justice Stone stated:
"The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.
There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declara-
tory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it has been es-
tablished by the constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to
allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted,
and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.... From
the beginning and for many years the amendment has been construed as not depriving
the national government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted
power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end."
See Feller, The Tenth Anemcnnt Retires, 27 A. B. A. J. 223 (1941); Comment,
37 COL. L. REv. 1361, 1362 (1937).
199. See note 166 supra.
200. Note, 33 HARv. L. REv. 281, 287 (1919).
201. 252 U. S. 416, 433 (1920). For further comment on this point see Coawn.-, Tun
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It is, if possible, even more firmly established that the scope of the
treaty power is not limited by the powers otherwise delegated by the
Constitution to the whole Congress. Though the treaty-power and the
delegated and inherent powers of Congress frequently refer to the
same events in our international affairs they are concurrent, not con-
flicting.20 2 It is suggested by Professor Corwin that the power to
appropriate money and possibly to incorporate territory are excep-
tions.213 But with that question we need not'concern ourselves here,
neither problem having relevance to the human rights program. It is
sufficient to note that treaties have dealt again and again with sub-
jects otherwise delegated to Congress. Witness, for example, the array
of agreements, which might otherwise be regulated under the commerce
power, affecting customs duties and regulating commerce. 24 Treaties
have also extended to copyrights, naval armament, and taxation, each
of which equally comports with a specifically granted Congressional
power. 215 That there is no conflict is evidenced in the unquestioned
rule of law that treaties may supersede prior Congressional acts.
On this point it was stated in Foster v. Neilson,2°1 a case involving the
validity of the Spanish grants in West Florida and the effect to be
given to the Treaty of 1819 with Spain: "Our Constitution declares a
treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in
Courts of Justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever
it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision." 207
This is not to say that the converse is not also true, that an act of
Congress of later date may not override, from the point of view of
domestic law, the provisions of a treaty.28 But this fact is irrelevant
to the question of limitation of the treaty power; it is only concerned
with the termination of individual rights created by treaty and, more-
CoNsTrruI N AND WORLD ORGANIZAnON 14-15 (1944); Hughes, .rupra note 166, at 194;
Butler, mupra note 170, at 178.
202. See Burr, supra note 166, at 306; Kuhn, mspra note 166, at 183; 5 MOORE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW DIGEST 164 (1906). The cases are collected in WEINFELD, LABOR TREATIES
AND LABOR CoMPAcTs 25 et seq. (1937).
203. CoRwiN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY 9-13 (1913).
204. Cf. commercial aviation, trade-marks, agriculture, trade in dangerous drugs, traffic
in women, to list a few. See WEINFELD, op. cit. vipra note 166, at 5; CoRwIN, op. cit.
mpra note 203, at 11, and cases therein cited; McDougal and Lans, Treaties and Coll-
gressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instrionents of National
Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 273-278 (1945). On this point Burr remarks:
"Inasmuch as the Supreme Court has spoken so often, so uniformly, so positively,
upon the question discussed in the preceding cases, it would seem almost a work of super-
erogation to inquire how many treaties have been made regulating commerce, and put
into effect without any act of Congress." Burr, supra note 166, at 322.
205. See WEINFELD, op. cit. supra note 166, at 5, 30.
206. 2 Pet. 253 (U. S. 1829).
207. Id. at 314.
208. The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616 (U. S. 1870) ; Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U. S. 190 (1888) ; Edye v. Robertson, 112 U. S. 580 (1884).
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over, as to that termination extends only to the internal domestic
effectiveness, since no Congressional act can abrogate a treaty in terms
of international obligation. 219 It has no bearing on the scope of sub-
jects which a treaty may embrace, nor on the international effective-
ness of such a treaty. Speaking of the Chinese Exclusion case,210 which
concerned just such an abrogation by act of Congress of the Treaty of
1881 with China, Burr remarks:
"Yet nowhere creeps in a suggestion that the provisions of the
treaties with China dealing with and regulating commerce and
immigration, are ineffective as laws; indeed, the cases are suffused
with the light of the contrary assumption and constitute direct and
positive decisions recognizing and establishing the efficacy of treaty
provisions propriore vigore." 211
From the preponderance of cases in this vein and of like authoritative
opinions it is clear that congressional powers impose no constitutional
bar to the protection of human rights through the treaty power.
A very good case can indeed be made for the converse proposition
that the treaty power imposes no limits on the powers of the whole
Congress and that there exists through a combination of the powers
of the Congress and the President a plenary federal power over foreign
affairs which offers a procedure, completely interchangeable with and
alternative to the treaty, for the making and implementation of inter-
national agreements. 21 2 It is not disputed today that the President has
exclusive control over the actual conduct of all negotiations with other
nations and that he is the appropriate authority to make final utterance
of an agreement as the international obligation of the United States. 2
1 3
It is likewise clear that the whole Congress has wide powers, granted
by the express terms of the Constitution and exercised in hundreds of
instances since the beginning of our history, to frame policies to guide
209. See Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in International Rela-
tions: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 25 CA.IF. L. REv. 643, 656-661 (1937).
Compare Jones, Constitutional Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power, 35 Am. J. IT'L
L. 462 (1941), which deals with the international aspects of the problem.
210. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581 (1889).
211. Burr, supra note 166, at 318.
212. For 250 pages of documentation of the general point, see IfcDougal and Lans,
Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable In-
struments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 534 (1945). See also Co.wnz, Tim
CONSTITUTION AND WOLD ORGANIZATION 8 (1944); M.fcCLuRE, INTERNATION'0AL EXECU-
TIVE AGREEmmENTS: DEmocRATIc PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UITMD
STATES (1941); Wright, The United States and International Agreements, 38 Am J.
INT'L L. 341 (1944); Dickey, Our Treaty Procedure Versus Our Foreign Policies, 25
FOREIGN ARas 357 (1947).
213. McDougal and Lans, supra note 212, at 244 et seq.; Wright, supra note 212, at 355.
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the President in his conduct of negotiations and to validate agreements
negotiated by him as the law of the land.
214
The Congress has broad powers "to . . . provide for the common
defense and general welfare of the United States," 211 "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States," 210
"to define and punish ... offenses against the law of nations," 217
"to declare war," 218 "to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other
powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof," 219 and, hence, to
implement the Bill-of-Rights 220 amendments to the Constitution; and
these powers are coming to be more and more broadly construed as the
exigencies of the nation require. Thus, the war power is held not
restricted to "the winning of victories in the field and the repulse of
enemy forces," but to extend to "every matter so related to war as
substantially to affect its conduct and progress." 221 Embracing the
daily intricacies of the national economy, this power has been invoked
to sustain as late as in 1948 the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 on the
ground that war does not end with the cessation of hostilities. 2 2 Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court, in Justice Murphy's words, now insists
"that the federal commerce power is as broad as the needs of the
nation" and that it cannot "deny that Congress can effectively deal
with problems concerning the welfare of the national economy." 223
The foreign commerce clause shares this broad construction and has
214. McDougal and Lans, supra note 212, at 238 et seq.; Hackworth, Legal Aspects
of the Trade Agreements of 1934,21 A. B. A. J. 570 (1935).
215. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, par. 1.
216. Id. par. 3. It may be noted that the Supreme Court did not hold in Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920), supra note 173, that the commerce power did not extend to
regulating the flight of birds. It assumed the point arguendo. Justice Holmes' dictum that
the treaty power might extend beyond the scope of the powers expressly delegated to the
Congress was uttered before the Court had officially declared the Tenth Amendment a
truism for all purposes, before the Court had reverted to the early broad interpretations of
the commerce power, and before the doctrine of "inherent powers" had received its present
broad application to agreements other than treaties. It is not to be expected that future
courts will regard a dictum uttered in such a context as imposing any serious limit on
the powers of the Congress. For discussion, see McDougal and Lans, supra note 212 at
285.
217. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, par. 10.
218. Id. par. 11.
219. Id. par. 18.
220. For the broad federal powers over civil rights and liberties which can be used
to authorize international agreements see infra, Section VI. THE PRESIDENT's CoMMITEE
ON CiviL. RIGHTS, To SEcuRE THESE RIGHTS 107 (1947) offers a survey of the relevant
constitutional powers.
221. Chief Justice Stone for the Court in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81,
93 (1943).
222. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
223. American Power and Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 103 (1946).
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been held to sustain tariff duties which could not be upheld under the
tax power. Speaking for a unanimous court in this case, University
of Illinois v. United States,224 Justice Hughes commented: "In inter-
national relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade,
the people of the United States act through a single government with
unified and adequate national power." The power of Congress to
control aliens, though not a specifically delegated power, charts the
same course. In Fong Yve Ting v. United States,2 2 Justice Gray upheld
deportation of aliens at the option of Congress saying:
"The United States are a sovereign and independent nation, and
are vested by the Constitution with the entire control of inter-
national relations, and with all the powers of government neces-
sary to maintain that control and make it effective. The only
government of this country, which other nations recognize or
treat with, is the Government of the Union. .... ."
And more recently a Pennsylvania statute which sought to regulate
aliens was held unconstitutional, as a violation of the principle of
supremacy. 22 "The supremacy of the national power," said Justice
Black for the Court, "in the general field of foreign affairs, including
power over immigration, naturalization and deportation, is made clear
by the Constitution, was pointed out by the authors of The Federalist
in 1787, and has since been given continuous recognition by this
Court." 227
Supplementing these powers of the Congress, the powers of the
President as "the Executive," 228 as "the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy," 229 etc., and as agent for Congress, make up a full
complement of powers adequate to deal with all phases of international
life. Independent of Congress, the President may negotiate agreements
with foreign nations within the scope of his own delegated powers,
-2
20
while as agent for Congress, under its powers as recited above, it has
been customary for the President since 1792 to negotiate international
agreements on a great range of important topics of ever increasing
variety. 231 How far the powers of the President alone extend, it is not
224. 289 U. S. 48, 59 (1933).
225. 149 U. S. 698, 711 (1893).
226. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941).
227. Id. at 62.
228. U. S. CoxsT. Art. II, § 1, par. 1.
229. Id. § 2, par. 1.
230. See McDougal and Lans, mupra note 212, at 246-252. Cf. United States v. Bel-
mont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937).
231. See B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U. S. 583 (1912) ; Field v. Clark, 143
U. S. 649 (1892) ; Hampton and Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928). McDougal
and Lans, supra note 212, at 252-254, 273 et seq. In addition to commercial agreements
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necessary to speculate; it is sufficient for present purposes that the
powers of Congress when conjoined with those of the President are
plenary.
To augment the express powers of the Congress and the President,
to close any conceivable gaps, and hence to insure the plenary character
of these powers in any eventuality, there is available a well-established
doctrine, the doctrine of "inherent powers" in international affairs,
which "has had a long and honorable history of effective work in the
national interest," 232 and which in one form or another is subscribed
to by most commentators on the Constitution. 23 The most famous re-
cent exposition of this doctrine is that of Justice Sutherland, speaking
for the Court, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation.23 4 Up-
holding the power of the President to impose by proclamation, pur-
suant to a Joint Resolution of Congress, an embargo on the shipment
of arms, Justice Sutherland clarified the difference between federal
powers in the domestic and in the international field, saying: 235
"The two classes of powers are different, both in respect of their
origin and their nature. The broad statement that the Federal
government can exercise no powers except those specifically enum-
erated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are neces-
sary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is cate-
gorically true only in respect of our internal affairs ...
"It results that the investment of the Federal government with
the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirma-
tive grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage
war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic
relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been men-
tioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the Federal gov-
ernment as necessary concomitants of nationality. Neither the
Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force
some of the subjects covered are acquisition of territory, settlement of international claims,
adherence to international organizations (see I. L. 0., Universal Postal Union, Interna-
tional Penal Prison Commission, UNRRA, Bretton Woods, etc.) and international finan-
cial and war debt agreements. Id. at 261-263, 278-282.
232. McDougal and Lans, supra note 212, at 255.
If it be suggested that this completely comprehensive power of the Federal Government
over foreign affairs can exhaust itself through the treaty power, Professor Corwin in
THE CONSTITUTION AND WOaRLD ORGANIZATION 19 (1944) answers:
"As a matter of history the notion of the indefinite scope of the treaty-making power
is itself reflective of the concept of the National Government's plenary powers in the field
of foreign relation and was not always conceded in earlier days."
233. For the semantic equivalence of doctrines of "implied powers" and "constructive
powers," with citation to various authorities, see McDougal and Lans, .rupra note 212, at
256 et seq. See also CoRwIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 17-20
(1944) ; THE PRESIDENT, OFFcE AND POWERS 209-211 (3rd rev. ed. 1948) ; Culp, Execu-
tive Power in Emergencies, 31 MIcH. L. Rxv. 1066 (1933).
234. 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
235. Id. at 318.
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in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens . . .; and
operations of the nation in such territory must be governed by
treaties, international understandings and compacts, and the
principles of international law. As a member of the family of na-
tions, the right and power of the United States in that field are
equal to the right and power of the other members of the inter-
national family. Otherwise, the United States is not completely
sovereign. The power to acquire territory by discovery and occu-
pation (Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 212), the power to
expel undesirable aliens (Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S.
698, 705 el seq.), the power to make such international agreements
as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense (Altman &
Co. v. United States, 224 U. S. 583, 600, 601; Crandall, Treaties,
Their Making and Enforcement, 2d ed., p. 102 and note 1), none of
which is expressly affirmed by the Constitution, nevertheless exist
as inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality."
From this decision and others it is clear that neither the doctrine of
enumerated powers nor the separation of powers 21 doctrine has the
slightest force in impeding the comprehensive and effective cooperation
of the President and Congress in the field of international relations. 2r,
In the light of these facts, it may be concluded that the United
States has a choice of procedural alternatives-treaty or Congressional-
executive agreement, and each fully competent-for implementing its
participation in the human rights program. As emphasized by Professor
Garner, Reporter for the Harvard Research Draft of the Law of Treaties,
any particular choice between these alternatives is "a matter of prac-
tical convenience or political expediency rather than of constitutional
law." "If the procedure of treaty regulation proves ineffective in a
236. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 23 (1944) ; Riesenfeld,
smpra note 209, at 674-675.
237. It should be noted that Congressional-executive agreements are effective as the
"law of the land" and have the same overriding effects as treaties in respect to state law.
This is true even of Presidential agreements. For distinguished authority see United
States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937) ; United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
Justice Sutherland for the Court declared in the earlier case:
"Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard
to State laws or policies. The supremacy of a treaty in this respect has been recognized
from the beginning.... In respect of all negotiations and compacts, and in respect of
our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the State of
New York does not exist. Within the field of its powers, whatever the United States
rightfully undertakes, it necessarily has warrant to consummate. And when judicial
authority is invoked in aid of such consummation, state constitutions, state laws, and
state policies are irrelevant to the inquiry and decision. It is inconceivable that any of
them can be interposed as an obstacle to the effective operation of a federal constitutional
power!
d. at 331-332. This language is quoted with approval by Justice Douglas in the Pinh
case, supra, at 223. For succinct summary of this point see Comment, Unitcd States v. Pin:
-A Reappraisal, 48 COL. L. Rav. 890, 896-7 (1948).
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particular case because of the constitutional impediment relative to
ratification," writes Professor Garner, "there is no reason of consti-
tutional or international law why recourse to the easier alternative of
legislative action cannot be had, if the President and a majority of the
two Houses of Congress so desire, as has been done with success on
various occasions in the past." 238
To establish that federal power over foreign affairs, whether exer-
cised by treaty or Congressional-executive agreement, is ample to
implement an effective covenant on human rights, it is not necessary
to establish, as the bar leaders demand, that this power is limitless.
So long as the Supreme Court sits, honors the Fifth Amendment, and
is able to make its decrees effective, the tyranny they fear is illusory.
The safeguards of the Fifth Amendment and the other Bill-of-Rights
provisions stand unquestionably in the way of abuse of power over
foreign affairs. While it is true that there has never been a square
holding that the Fifth Amendment, or other prohibitions of the Con-
stitution, are applicable to the substantive provisions of a treaty, 3
the dicta are relentlessly consistent, 240 and the consensus of opinion 241
unflagging, in affirming this proposition. "Resting upon the funda-
mental grounds that it [the Fifth Amendment] does," comments Pro-
fessor Corwin, "it may be confidently claimed as establishing the
238. Garner, Acts and Joint Resolutions of Congress as Substitutes for Treaties, 29 Am.
J. INT'L L. 482, 488 (1935).
The special problems that would be involved in our adherence to an International
Court of Human Rights can be resolved when, and if, the occasion arises, There is con-
siderable opinion that such a court would not offer the best technical means of imple-
mentation. LAUTERPACHT, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
AND THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO INTER-
NATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, BRUSSELS CONFERENCE (1948). If, however, such a court
should be decided upon, the constitutional difficulties do not appear insuperable. See
Wright, Treaties and the Constitutional Separation of Powers in the United States, 12
Am. J. INT'L L. 64, 85-90 (1918) ; Comment, 58 YALE L. J. 1142, 1155 (1949).
239. RoTrscHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 385 (1939);
WEINFELD, op. cit. supra note 166, at 31.
240. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 267 (1890):
"It would not be contended that it [the treaty-power] extends so far as to authorize
what the Constitution forbids. .. ."
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 341 (1924):
"... it [the treaty-power] does not extend so far as to authorize what the Constitu-
tion forbids. . . ." See also The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616 (U. S. 1870) ; Brown
v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 197 (U. S. 1856); Doe v. Braden, 16 How. 635, 656 (U. S.
1853); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 370 (1901). But cf. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dalil.
199 (U. S. 1796). On this point the case is probably dubious law today. See COWLES,
TREATIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PROPERTY INTERFERENCES AND DUE PROCESs op
LAW (1941), a definitive work which reviews all the cases and literature and thoroughly es-
tablishes the conclusions expressed in our text.
241. 2 BUTLER, op. cit. supra note 166, § 442; COWLES, op. cit. supra note 240; 1 WIL-
LOUGIBY, op. cit. supra note 166, § 219; Weinfeld, Labor Treaties and the Due Process
Clause, 6 BROOKLYN L. REv. 338 (1937).
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limits, not merely of congressional power, but of the treaty-power as
well, whenever it impinges upon private rights." 242 It is this restriction
which unquestionably gives substance to the constantly reiterated
prohibition against treaties authorizing "what the Constitution for-
bids." 243 What applies to treaties is equally applicable to Congres-
sional-executive agreements.244 There is nothing in either the decision
or opinion in the recent, much-mooted case of Pink v. United States 2415
to support a contrary conclusion. The ground for the decision in that
case, which concerned the effect of an executive agreement between
President Roosevelt and Litvinov, assigning the New York assets of a
Russian insurance company to the United States, was that under the
facts-all. American creditors of the insurance company having been
satisfied prior to suit by the United States-the Federal Government
could in the interest of protecting general creditors of Russia in the
United States be permitted to give itself priority over foreign creditors
without doing violence to the Fifth Amendment. The opinion of the
Court, by Justice Douglas, clearly assumed that the Fifth Amendment
was applicable ("To be sure, aliens as -well as citizens are entitled to
the protection of the Fifth Amendment"), but urged that the Federal
Government was no more barred by the terms of that Amendment
from securing priority for itself and its nationals over foreign creditors
than states were precluded from similar preference under the Four-
teenth Amendment.2 4 Despite the sad plight of foreign creditors of
expropriated Russian corporations, there is no doubt that the great
protections of the Constitution remain for residents of the United
States, citizen and alien.
Legislation implementing treaties has, moreover, been categorically
declared subject to the Fifth Amendment. It is ironic that a decision
upholding slavery need be invoked to support a program for human
rights. Nonetheless, in the Dred Scott 247 case the issue was the con-
stitutionality of the "Missouri Compromise," an act which pursuant
to Article III of the Treaty of Cession of Louisiana 246 abolished
slavery (Missouri excepted) in the Louisiana Purchase area. In striking
down this act Chief Justice Taney held that the taking of property in
slaves without just compensation was a violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment. It is not to be expected that the Court would today do less in
the cause of freedom.
242. CoRxwT, op. cit. supra note 166, at 17.
243. See note 240 supra.
244. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 143 (1937); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 320 (1936).
245. 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
246. Id. at 228; see Comment, supra note 237, at 897-899.
247. Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393,446-454 (U. S. 1857).
248. See CoWms, op. cit. mipra note 240, at 159-176.
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The final constitutional charge of the bar leaders that the United
States is peculiarly vulnerable in international undertakings about
human rights, because, unlike in many countries, its treaties if intended
to be self-executing, are self-executing as laws of the land, 249 is in-
consequential. Even assuming that there is any danger in reaffirmation
through international agreement of our respect for fundamental
human rights, several remedies are ready to hand. The agreement can
by its terms be made effective internally in this country only when
other states similarly implement it; or reservation in such terms can
be attached to our ratification; or assuming we accept immediate
obligation and bad faith develops in other countries, the Congress can
promptly abrogate any internal obligation. In case of bad faith by
other countries, well-hallowed doctrines of international law, such as
rebus sic stantibus 250 and abrogation for failure of performance, are
available to discharge even any international obligation we may have
assumed.
VI
From the perspective of centuries necessary to realistic appraisal of
the United Nations human rights program, it is obvious not only that
it is not impolitic for the United States to participate in that program
but that it would be most impolitic for the United States to fail to
assume the leadership that world events have thrust upon it. The hu-
man rights program is but an integral and indispensable part of a
total program designed to preserve peace and to maintain a free society
for as many as possible of the peoples of the world-a program sup-
ported by the whole free world and today the principal concern of our
national policy and national effort.2"' So far from being a product or
249. Briggs, in THE LAW OF NATIONS: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND NOTES 432, 433
(1938), cites a surprising number of countries as in accord with the United States. He
writes:
"In many states the constitution or constitutional practice stipulates that international
law-or at least treaties-are the law of the land. This is the practice of the United States,
Switzerland, France and Belgium (with qualifications), Holland, Spain, Germany (Art.
4 of the Constitution of 1919), Austria, Estonia, Egypt, Argentina, many South American
states, and possibly others."
The British practice Which requires an act of the executive plus approval of Parlia-
ment to make an agreement the law of the land, if it brings any changes, is in fact not too
different from United States practice which requires an act of the executive plus, for
agreements beyond the scope of the President's own power, the approval of the Senate or
of the whole Congress. See WILCOX, THE RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONVEN-
TIoNs 78 (1935).
250. See BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 249, at 477 et seq. with citations. For the practice,
legality, and technique of reservations, see WILCOX, op. cit. .rupra note 249, at 47; 5 HACI:-
WORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (1943); HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTnNA-
TIONAL LAW, LAW OF TnrTEs 843 (1935) ; MmILER, REsERvATioxs TO TREATIES (1919).
251. It is significant that the Russian response to the human rights program has been
marked by caution only comparable to that of the American bar leaders. The Declaration
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hallmark of totalitarianism or statism of any kind, human rights
guarantees, even when supplemented by concern for that economic
opportunity without which no rights can be secure,2 2 are a product of
our own liberal revolution and are indispensable to a free society. The
basic element in any human rights guarantee is the presumption of
private choice and the insistence that, in so far as is compatible with
the best interests of the community as a whole, private choice be
protected against coercion of any kind, from any possible source,
governmental or otherwise. It is this emphasis upon private choice
in all aspects of life which distinguishes a free society from total-
itarianisms which rely and depend upon dictation, coercion, and vio-
lence. The greatest single issue before the world today is whether a
was found "acceptable" on the whole, but also "unsatisfactory" because among other
reasons it contained no machinery for enforcement. See U. N. Document E/SOO, 1943, pp.
29, 30. Yet the consistent Russian position during the 1949 Session of the Human Rights
Commission was that no enforcement of human rights on the international level could be
tolerated. In supporting this rigid and legalistic conception of "sovereignly," Mr. Pavlov
has insisted before the Commission that Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter would be
violated if any other course were taken. See U. N. Documents E/CN4/111 (June 10,
1949) ; d./114 (June 16, 1949). See also Soviet Statement on Implementation Members,
E/CN4/154 (June 24, 1948), in which all the draft proposals submitted for implementa-
tion of human rights were rejected. In a vein all too familiar, the Soviet objection reads:
"It [the Soviet Delegation] notes that all these drafts and proposals interpret im-
plementation to mean not a system of measures for ensuring that human rights are im-
plemented and guaranteed in every country by the State and society, but rather, a system
of international methods of pressure to be exereised through special organs established
for this purpose (e.g., an international court, international committee or a United Nati,7ns
public prosecutor, etc.), and intended to force individual States to take particular steps
connected with execution of the Convention on Human Rights.
"It is dear, therefore, that such 'implementation' may become a means of interfering
in the internal affairs of a State party to the Convention, and of undermining the sover-
eignty and independence of particular States... !'
For earlier Soviet views and analysis of Soviet law see Hazard, The Soticl Union and a
World Bill of Rights, 47 CoL. L. Rxv. 1095 (1947).
It is not to be expected that the Soviets will subscribe to many of the political rights
regarded by the West as indispensable to freedom. To the extent, however, that they
will agree to an authoritative formulation of rights that free peoples cherish, there is so
much gain. To the extent that they refuse to agree, the lines between the objectives of
the Soviets and other peoples are only more dearly drawn.
252. That human rights are incomplete without opportunity for economic freedom is
now axiomatic. Thus Becker, in developing the principal theme of a brilliant book,
MODERNW DEmOCRAcY (1941) writes (at p. 62) :
"What the average man now needs is the opportunity to acquire by his own effort, in
an occupation for which he is fitted, the economic security which is essential to decent and
independent living."
More famous is Anatole France's reference to "the majestic equality of the laws, which
forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal
their bread." Quoted in MIERaIuA, SYSTE.mATIc PoLrrics 55, 56 (1945). For excellent
expositions, see TAwNEY, EQUALITY (1931), and the essays by Woodward and Carr in
U nivRsrry oF Dnviza, FOUNDATioNS FoR WoPm ORDER (1949).
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society which emphasizes private choice as opposed to external dic-
tation can survive. In an unorganized world faced with possible an-
nihilation, it is a grave question whether the centuries-long trend from
a coercive, caste, and immobile society toward a more and more per-
fectly realized democracy can be continued, or must give way to pre-
cipitous descent into the closed society of garrison-prison states, dom-
inated by a new caste specializing in violence.
It should need no emphasis that one condition of the survival of a
free society is a vision, fortified with reasonable hopes of fulfillment,
by the peoples of the world of what a free society can offer. Loyalties
that are not indissolubly tied to democracy can be captured by total-
itarianism. It is not suggested that a human rights program alone can
embody all the conditions necessary to preserve peace and a free
society in the contemporary world. The total conditions of peace and
a free society must include the creation of institutions and a production
and distribution of values adequate to take account of all the world-
wide interdependences described above.21 3 In terms of institutions,
this means a sufficient organization of world-wide community coercion
to maintain freedom from violence and aggression and to "provide a
framework of policy and regulation which will permit the peoples of
the world to pursue all their values by peaceful procedures." 214 In
terms of values, it means both a certain concentration and certain
dispersal of power and "a certain balance of income and wealth, a lack
of discrimination for reasons irrelevant to capacity under respect, a
flow of realistic information under enlightenment, less destructive
personality formation under character, a growing common standard of
right under rectitude," and so on.255 The indispensable function among
these conditions of a human rights program, with its enshrinement of
the "deep historic experience" and "moral sense of mankind" 211 into
world constitutional doctrine, should be clear. Its function is to clarify
the values of the people of the world in terms of the values of a free
society, to reinforce their expectations that they can best maximize
their own personal values in such society, to cement their loyalties
to such society, to promote that consensus with respect to democratic
values which will reduce to the minimum the need to use coercion to
compel lawless dissenters, to further the increasing identifications of
free peoples with all other free peoples, and in general to predispose
the peoples of the world to the creation of the institutions necessary
253. For development see McDougal, The Role of Law in World Politics, 20 Miss.
L.J. 254 (1949).
254. Id. at 277.
255. Id. at 278.
256. LAUTERPACHT, PRELMIINARY REPORT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, BRUS-
SELS CONFERENcE 27 (1948) (U. N. Document E/CN4/89, 1948).
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to survival in this atomic era.257 To recapitulate in detail the promise
of such a program in terms of all of man's basic values-in providing
the access to political power upon which freedom and peace depend,
in promoting the flow of enlightenment necessary to sustain democratic
processes, in establishing the equality necessary for recognition of
common merit as a human being and special merit as an individual,
and so on-is certainly here superfluous.2- 3
To most men of good will it is obvious that the United States has
peculiar responsibilities of leadership in the human rights program,
not only in aid of its own survival but, because of its paramount power
position among free peoples, also in aid of the survival of all such
peoples. It is common knowledge that since World War II the United
States has been singularly inept in formulating a comprehensive and
positive moral doctrine behind which the free people of the world can
unite. In Persuade or Perish, a book too little read, a distinguished
writer convincingly urges that "it is hardly an exaggeration that we
must persuade or perish," 2159 that we must produce a positive, world-
257. For itemization of some of the beneficent effects of earlier human rights declara-
tions, see TAwNEY, EQUALITY 134 et seq. (1931).
A leap from the premise that since some treaties have been regarded as mere "scraps
of paper" to the conclusion that any principle, enshrined in great state papers or constitu-
tional documents, must be futile and without effects on the world power process, involves
a very considerable underestimation of the role that authoritatively formulated principle
can be made to play in the affairs of men.
A similar fallacy underlies the repeated suggestion that human rights stem from some
source higher than government and that not only can government do little to secure them
but also any effort by government to secure them is likely to endanger them. To recog-
nize that devotion to human rights has many justifications-religious, natural law, and
other-rooted deep in man's nature, it is not necessary to ignore that such rights often get
scant protection in fact if they do not have government or centralized community coercion
behind them. One wonders whether the opponents of the United Nations program regard
the Bill-of-Rights provisions in our own Constitution as superfluous and why, in contra-
diction of their premises, they shudder for the fate of any rights that may be omitted from
the United Nations program. Mien have always sought to secure their rights by that
formulation of principle and balancing of power which we call government; the alternative
to government is anarchy and rule by private violence. To fail to distinguish the moral
justifications for rights from the realities of the power necessary to protect them is simple,
and perhaps suicidal, intellectual confusion.
258. It will be observed that the case we make is not so much for the latest draft of the
proposed Covenant on Human Rights, though we think it good so far as it goes, as for the
dnd of Covenant that the United States should establish as its goal. It is our judgment
after detailed analysis, recital of which is not necessary to our present purposes, of both
the Genocide Convention and the draft Covenant on Human Rights, that they in no way
change, but rather re-enunciate, standards which we have professed in this country since
the Civil War. Hence any criticism we might make of the content of the proposed agree-
ments would be, not for their inclusions, but for their omissions-for their failure to in-
corporate, and perhaps even to raise, more of the standards which we and other free peoples
profess to honor and to regard as necessary for survival.
259. CARnOr, PRSUADE OR P IsH 389 (1948).
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encompassing faith or find ourselves isolated even from other free
peoples. The human rights program offers us an opportunity, un-
paralleled in its potentialities, to assume and give concreteness to the
moral leadership incumbent upon us. 260
So much misconception is abroad, it may bear emphasis that par-
ticipation by the United States in this United Nations program for
securing human rights imports no revolutionary changes in our form
of government, increases no dangers of federal absolutism, and shifts
no real power from the states to the federal government that the course
of events has not already shifted. 21 The truth is that the social and
economic, and hence constitutional, structure of the United States has
had no immunity from the forces that have made for interdependence
in the world at large. The same forces that operate to make the world
one, operate even more intensely to make this nation one, not only as
to foreign affairs and domestic economy, but as to all values: the
degree of democracy in participation in power processes; the sanctity,
freedom from arbitrary restraint, and well-being of the individual
human being; the free flow of enlightenment; and so on. For several
decades this national unity and interdependence in fact have found
expression at an accelerating tempo in our formal constitutional doc-
trine. Concomitant with the expansion of federal power through in-
terpretation of the commerce and other clauses, 2 2 has come a striking
increase of federal supervision over civil rights and liberties.213 More
260. The fear, so dramatically emphasized by the bar leaders, that the United States
might by entering into new agreements expose itself to a losing battle of mutual recrimina-
tions with the Russians is idle. Our practices are not so vulnerable as such fear implies:
such a battle is possible under the present United Nations Charter and is going on; and
there is no reason to assume that our own diplomats would be disadvantaged by having a
new set of premises, assuming that the Russians subscribe, for inquiring into some of the
obscurities of Russian practice. The iewspapers have indeed been filled recently with
stories about some questions of slave labor and of violations of human rights in Russian
satellite countries. More positively we have, as indicated above, in the symbols of free-
dom, democracy, and equality instruments of potentially tremendous power for capturing
and holding the loyalties of peoples; to leave these symbols to the exploitation of others,
who in fact make a mockery of them by denying access to the very values that make them
meaningful, can only be folly. Our national concern must be, not so much for Russian
criticism, as for what the rest of the world really, and should deservedly, think of us. In
the words of THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMiTrEF ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To Swcuiut THiSE RioTS 148
(1947) : "The United States is not so strong, the final triumph of the democratic ideal is
not so inevitable that we can ignore what the world thinks of us or our record."
261. "The advance of federal power, however much we may regret," one writer ob-
serves, "seems to have been in the main as inevitable as the advance of science which pro-
duced it." Green, The Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights and the States, 97 U. op PA. L.
REv. 608, 615 (1949).
262. See Green, supra note 261, at 614-615; Fellman, Recent Tendencies in Civil Liber.
ties Decisions of the Suprene Court, 34 CORN. L. Q. 331, 332 (1949).
263. For notable articles among many on this subject, see Lusky, Minority Rights and
the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1 (1942) ; Berger, The Supreme Court and Group Dis.
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and more the Supreme Court has conceived and established itself,
under a great variety of constitutional provisions, as a unifying and
norm-setting agency for the entire nation.2 "4 The national interest
that this development continue, with legislative support, has been
demonstrated by many observers and is the official platform of both
major political parties. 25 The same considerations that make human
rights of world-wide concern as among nations apply, with all the
added intensity of the forces operating for national interdependence,
to make such rights of nation-wide concern for our people.
To dispel fears of novelty in the human rights program, the trend in
decision by the Supreme Court to establish national standards may be
indicated in detail. The chief vehicle for development has been the
Fourteenth Amendment, expanded both in its application to parties
and in the scope of rights protected. The criterion of what constitutes
"state" action in the application of this Amendment has been pro-
gressively broadened, culminating in decisions finding "state" action
in unauthorized acts of state officials, 211 in determinations of political
crimination Since 1937, 49 COL. L. REv. 201 (1949); Green, supra note 261; Green, The
Bill of Rights, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court, 46 Mica. L Rnv. 869
(1948) ; Fellman, supra note 262; Boskey and Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State
Criminal Procedure, 13 U. OF CHL L. REv. 266 (1946) ; Comment, The Adamson Case: A
Study in Constitutional Technique, 58 YALm L.J. 268 (1949). See also for more general
surveys of the problem: KoxvrIz, THE CONSTITUTION AND Cvr. RIGHS (1947); CA,
FEDM L PRoTEcTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD (1947); and Fraenkel, The
Federal Civil Rights Laws, 31 MINN. L. REv. 301 (1947).
264. An illuminating discussion of this process is to be found in Lusky, supra note 263,
especially at 13-21. See also Hamilton and Braden, The Special Competence of the Sit-
preme Court, 50 YALE L.J. 1319, 1349 (1941).
265. Republican Party Platform, June 22, 1948; Democratic Party Platform, July 14,
1948.
Among the better statements of the national interest are Lusky, supra note 263; CLAMt
AND PERLMAN, PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY (1948), the brief for the United States as Anicus
Curiae in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948) ; REPORT OF TE PRI.ET'Trs Colnnrnn
oN Civi RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS (1947). For some reflection of the prevail-
ing public concern for these questions, see the e.tensive list of organizations which filed
briefs Amicus Curiae in the Shelley case, supra: Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Four-
teenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. OF Car. L RE,. 203, 205 n.6
(1949).
Lusky, supra note 263 at 18-19, after detailed consideration of many aspects of national
interest, summarizes:
"The justification for Federal intervention in the field is therefore clear. There is a
national interest not only in preserving a form of government in which men can control
their own destinies, but in enabling the common man to see its advantages and kmow its
feasibility. It is an interest in quelling doubts as to the practical efficacy of our system to
accomplish essential justice. It is an interest in preventing deviations from our national
ideal, even in local government, because deviations create such doubts. In short, it is an
interest in making a belief in our system a part of the American creed."
266. Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945). See Kozrrz, op. cit. sutpra note
263, at 49-90; CAM, op. cit. supra note 263, at 112-114.
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parties,"7 in exclusions from company towns,68 and in the enforce-
ment of restrictive covenants by state courts.6 9 The scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment as applied against the states has been widened
notably also through incorporation, beginning in 1927, of all the po-
litical activity freedoms of the First Amendment (freedom of speech,
press, assembly) as well as freedom of religion and freedom to petition
Congress for redress of grievances.2 7 1 Moreover, the area of freedoms
outside the First Amendment and not yet enforceable against the
states is visibly contracting. Indication of the trend is the continuing
debate launched in the Adamson 271 case concerning the "incorpora-
tion" in toto of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black, joined by three other Jus-
tices, 272 wrote a challenging dissent in that case and demonstrated
with a compelling array of facts the unmistakable intention of the
sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment to make the Bill of Rights
applicable through it to the states.273 The majority, on the other
267. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944); Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516
(E.D.S.C. 1947), aff'd 165 F.2d 387, (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 875 (1948).
For a comprehensive treatment of "state" action see Hale, Rights Under the Fourteenlth
and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries Inflicted by Private Individuals, 6 LAW. GuILr
Rav. 627 (1946).
268. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946).
269. Shelley v. Kraemer and McGee v. Sipes, 334 U. S. 1 (1948). See Ming, Racial
Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. or
CHr. L. Ray. 203 (1949).
270. Free speech and press: Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1924) (dictum);
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927) (square holding). Assembly: De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U. S. 353 (1937) ; see also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937) ; Hague v. CIO,
307 U. S. 496 (1939). Religion: Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) ; but see
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944) (for adults only). Prohibition against
establishment of religion: Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203
(1948) ; compare Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). Petition of govern-
ment for redress of grievances: Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941). See Green,
supra note 261 passim.
271. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947). See Comment, 58 YALE L.J. 268
(1949).
272. Justice Douglas concurred in Justice Black's opinion, while Justice Murphy, joined
by Justice Rutledge, wrote a separate dissent in which he approved Black's position ex-
cepting only the novel limitation that the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is
limited by the Bill of Rights. Id. at 124.
273. Id. at 68 and 92 et seq.
The original view was well expressed by Justice Harlan's famous dissent in the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 26 (1883) : "I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance
and spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and
ingenious verbal criticism .... Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interest of
liberty, and for the purpose of securing, through national legislation, if need be, rights in-
hering in a state of freedom, and belonging to American citizenship, have been so con-
strued as to defeat the ends the people desired to accomplish . . . which they supposed
they had accomplished by changes in their fundamental law." Cf. Watt and Orlikoff, The
Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan, 44 ILL. L. Rxv. 13 (1949).
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hand, felt impelled to favor the "fair trial" rule which in effect confines
strict protection of the privilege against 'self-incrimination (or any
other appropriate safeguard of the Bill of Rights), through "incor-
poration" into the Fourteenth Amendment of the Fifth or other
corresponding Bill-of-Rights Amendments, to those cases in which
failure to enforce a Bill-of-Rights prohibition "would be lacking in
fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice." -4
Nevertheless, the incorporation rule was again advanced in a concur-
ring opinion by Justice Rutledge in In re Oliver, " 3 a case holding Mich-
igan's one man jury system responsible for violation of the requirement
of a public trial.2 16 XNhile the "fair trial" rule is never an absolute bar
to a selective incorporation-case by case-or independent determina-
tion of the rights of the suspect, accused and convicted,-" it never-
theless obscures the extent to and certainty with which Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Eighth Amendment protections are specifically applicable
to the states.278 But even this confusion does not interrupt the general
trend toward federal supervision. Notice of accusation and an impartial
tribunal are conceded an essential part of due process, - ° and federal
prohibition against coerced confessions in state courts has been recog-
nized since Brown v. Mississippi in 1936.2-0 Other decisions on the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, not involving the incorporation
of the Bill of Rights, show similar trends. In recent terms, equal
274. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 462 (1942). The "fair trial" rule w-as first intro-
duced in this case, which involved denial of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amend-
ment.
275. 333 U. S. 257 (1948).
276. The conflict in the Court between the incorporation rule and the fair trial rule
continues unabated. See the dissents similar to those in the Adamson case in Foster v.
Illinois, 332 U. S. 134 (1947) ; Gayes v. New York, 332 U. S. 145 (1947) ; Bute -. Illinois,
333 U. S. 640 (1948). And the more recent Gibbs v. Burke, 69 S. CL 1247 (1949), in
which Justices Black and Douglas concur in the finding that a fair trial had been denied
in an issue involving the right to counsel, but explicitly state that they "think Betts v.
Brady should be overruled." Id. at 1251.
277. See e.g., Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437 (1948) (failure to provide counsel
for 17 year old boy held denial of due process).
278. On searches and seizures, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 33 (1949) (Four-
teenth Amendment does not absorb this Fourth Amendment protection). The direct
application of the double jeopardy prohibition to states was assumed but not decided in
Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459 (1947), a capital case, in which a second electrocu-
tion was held not to be double jeopardy nor to infringe the prohibition against cruel and
inhuman punishments.
279. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 389-390 (1898); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S.
196 (1948). See Green, supra note 261, at 637. For confrontation of witnesses, see Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 131 (1934).
280. 297 U. S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 2-77 (1940). But see
Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941). In the past term of the Court see Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U. S. 62 (1949); Harris v.
South Carolina, 338 U. S. 68 (1949).
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protection has been widened by decisions invalidating discriminatory
presumptions in state align land laws,11 and prohibitions against
issuance of commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible to citizen-
ship; 2 and by a narrowing of the equal but separate facilities rule
through the requirement that educational facilities be furnished as
promptly for Negroes as for other groups. 283 The range of topics in-
cluded within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment as amplified
by the First Amendment enlarges continuously also. Freedom of
speech and press includes freedom from postal censorship, 24 peaceful
picketing, 5 and, more recently, freedom to use loud-speakers in
public streets,2 and to publish despite an indefinite prohibitory statute
"stories of bloodshed, lust or crime." 287 To these growing national
standards, may be added the fact that in determining the constitu-
tionality of a statute, the Supreme Court no longer abides by the
traditional presumption in favor of the statute where civil rights are
concerned,28 thus perceptibly increasing federal supervision. The
commerce clause too has been a means to national standards. Two
notable cases are Edwards v. California 289 and M1organ v. Virginia,
200
where it was held that interstate commerce was burdened by state
laws forbidding transportation of indigent persons into the state of
California, in the first case, and segregating Negroes in busses traveling
in interstate commerce, in the second. From this review, it is apparent
that any shift in formal authority from the states to the Federal
Government that might occur by our joining in an international
covenant to secure human rights could only anticipate a development
already rapidly going forward under other powers, a development
which promises a comprehensive structure of constitutional doctrine,
national in its application and adequate to secure the national interest.
It may, in conclusion, be emphasized that the bar leaders' recom-
mendation of the slow approach to human rights, that it is better to
await the evolutionary processes of customary law and not to use
agreement, that international law cannot be made in the "twinkling of
an eye," misconceives every factor upon which such recommendation
281. Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (1948).
282. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U. S. 410 (1948).
283. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631 (1948).
284. Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U. S. 146 (1946).
285. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940). But see Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949).
286. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). But see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S, 77
(1949).
287. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948).
288. See Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U. S. 144, 152, u.4
(1938). See also Fellman, supra note 262, at 348.
289. 314 U. S. 160 (1941).
290. 328 U. S. 373 (1946).
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is based: misconceives the intimate interdependences, if not identity,
of human rights and security, the world-wide interdependences of
peoples everywhere; misconceives our obligations under the United
Nations Charter, the potentialities of new agreement, and even the
reach of traditional, customary international law, with its fundamental
and continuous concern for the welfare of the individual human being;
misconceives both the scope of federal power under our Constitution
over matters of international concern and the safeguards imposed by
the Constitution on the exercise of such power; and, finally, miscon-
ceives the indispensability of human rights protection to a free society
and the degree to which this nation is becoming, and must be, "one"
for human rights as for other values. To go slow upon any measure
which promises to enhance security, whether conceived as freedom
from simple physical violence or as a broader freedom to pursue all
values by democratic procedures, may in the contemporary world
context be to invite destruction. A human rights program alone cannot
preclude atomic or bacteriological catastrophe, but such a program
can bring compellingly to the focus of world attention the needs and
aspirations of mankind in terms of human dignity and may, by cement-
ing loyalties to free society, be able to mobilize such aspirations in aid
of security rather than destruction. The people of the United States,
with their existing high standards for the protection qf human rights,
can have nothing whatsoever to lose by a program designed to raise
standards everywhere. "The argument that the time is not ripe for
extending the rule of law in relation to this or that proposal," an
English writer urges apropos human rights, "appears to me unsound.
Time is a forelock and, after great wars and great upheavals, that fore-
lock hangs out like a bell-rope and needs to be pulled." ,1 It can be
rational only for the United States acting promptly and effectively
after its great traditions to assert leadership in giving time's forelock
a world-resounding ring.
291. W. Harvey Moore in discussion of Internzational Law and Rights of thc Inditidual,
31 TJ. OF THE GaoQus Sociery 106 (1945).
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